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Delusions, Moral Incapacity, and the Case for Moral Wrongfulness
E. LEA JOHNSTON*
Responsibility is a legal—not medical—construct. However, science can be useful in
exposing faulty assumptions underlying current doctrine or practice, illuminating
changes in practice or evidentiary standards to better effectuate the law’s animating
purpose, and even suggesting updates to legal standards to account for modern
understandings of functionalities of concern. This Article uses the science of
delusions to assess the law regarding, and practice of establishing, criminal
irresponsibility for defendants with psychosis. Over the last two decades, researchers
from the cognitive sciences have compiled strong evidence that a host of cognitive
and emotional impairments contribute to the origin and maintenance of delusions by
impairing decision-making. This Article uses insights from those literatures to make
three contributions. First, it analyzes current insanity standards and demonstrates
their intimate relationship with rationality. It then argues that courts should consider
evidence of any significant reasoning impairment, whether cognitive or emotional,
as probative to sanity. Second, the Article explains how the reasoning impairments
associated with delusions should bear upon assessments of a defendant’s incapacity
to know, or ignorance of, the wrongfulness of her criminal act. In assessing the latter,
the Article argues that scientific research exposes as misguided the traditional rule
expressed in M’Naghten’s Case—which is currently followed to varying extents by
nine jurisdictions—that a delusional defendant lacked knowledge of her act’s
wrongfulness only if her delusion, if true, would have justified or excused her act.
Instead, the science exposes the strict legal wrongfulness standard as inappropriate
for populations with delusions and suggests that courts should consider excusing
defendants whose delusions cohere with the general thrust or gist of a legal defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Frank Rowl, age thirty-seven, moved to the basement of his parents’ home upon
release from his third civil commitment.1 Over the past five years, his schizophrenia
has been characterized by paranoid delusions involving an attempt by the John Birch
Society to take his life. Once home, Rowl began to suspect his parents were part of
the plot. Rowl refused to take vitamins supplied by his mother for fear they contained
poison, and he believed his parents spied on him with electronic devices.
One evening, when Rowl decided to go for a walk, he opened his closet door and
discovered his shotgun was missing. Rowl suspected his father had taken his gun, as
he had two other guns before Rowl’s latest civil commitment. Rowl believed his
father’s act was a deliberate attempt to render him defenseless against those plotting
to take his life. While rushing up the stairs to confront his father, Rowl overheard his
father state over the telephone, “He will have to be stopped.” (His father, a professor,
was discussing a campus event with a colleague.) Rowl mistakenly believed this
statement referred to him. When he reached the top of the stairway, Rowl stepped
into the kitchen, grabbed a butcher knife, and plunged it into his father’s back,
causing injuries that resulted in death the following day. Rowl was charged with
intentional murder and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The facts above would not support an insanity acquittal in some jurisdictions.2
Factoring the reasoning impairments associated with Rowl’s delusions into the test
for insanity, however, may justify a finding of irresponsibility. In some jurisdictions,
this would require departing from current practice, which subjects the content of
delusions to a strict legal wrongfulness standard.
Depending on the jurisdiction, to qualify for insanity, Rowl must prove that,3
because of a mental disease or defect, he lacked a substantial capacity to
“appreciate,” was unable to “know,” or was ignorant of the wrongfulness of killing

1. These facts are closely modeled on those in State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 776–
77 (Minn. 1972).
2. See infra Part III.B.1; E. Lea Johnston & Vincent T. Leahey, The Status and
Legitimacy of M'Naghten’s Insane Delusion Rule, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1777, 1795–98,
1813–19 (2021).
3. Most jurisdictions place the burden of proof upon the defendant. 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.3(a) (3d ed. 2018).
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his father at the time of the stabbing (“moral incapacity”).4 This Article considers
how Rowl’s delusions of a murderous plot may factor into his insanity defense under
the various moral incapacity tests currently employed in the United States. It also
gleans insights from behavioral and brain research to address the normative question
of how Rowl’s delusions should factor into his sanity evaluation and ultimate
defense. In so doing, this Article joins the call for a broader conception of insanity,
argues for a new understanding and expanded use of delusions in insanity cases, and
urges the adoption of a broader standard of wrongfulness for delusional defendants.
A substantial minority of insanity pleas involve psychosis.5 Thus, updating the
law’s understanding of delusions could affect the dispositions of a significant
percentage of those pleading the defense.6 Moreover, since courtroom actors and the
public tend to equate insanity with psychosis,7 expanding the accepted relevance of
cognitive and emotional impairments in psychosis holds the potential of shifting the
law toward a broader, more scientifically defensible model of culpability.8

4. See infra Part II.A (analyzing current insanity standards); Appendix (presenting key
portions of the insanity standards used in the United States). This Article focuses on the moral
incapacity prongs of jurisdictions’ standards. Most insanity cases turn on moral incapacity.
Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Psychiatrist’s Guide to Right and Wrong: Part III: Postpartum
Depression and the “Appreciation” of Wrongfulness, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
121, 121 (1989) (“In cognitive tests, a determination of insanity almost never deals with the
first prong of the legal test (i.e., whether the defendant knew or appreciated the ‘nature and
quality’ of his act), but decisively turns on the second prong (i.e., whether he knew or
appreciated that what he was doing was wrong).”); Richard Rogers, An Introduction to
Insanity Evaluations, in LEARNING FORENSIC ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 97, 99
(Rebecca Jackson & Ronald Roesch eds. 2015). The Article, therefore, does not allocate
significant attention to cognitive incapacity (an inability to know the nature or quality of the
criminal act), see infra note 80, or volitional incapacity (an inability to conform one’s conduct
to the requirements of law), see infra note 81.
5. See Lisa A. Callahan, Henry J. Steadman, Margaret A. McGreevy & Pamela Clark
Robbins, The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 336 tbl.2 (1991) (examining 8979 insanity pleas in
eight states and finding that 43% of insanity pleas (2869/8979) and 67.9% of insanity
acquittals (1592/2565) involved diagnosis of schizophrenia). According to Gary Melton and
colleagues, “virtually all studies of the subject indicate that the majority (60–90%) of
defendants acquitted by reason of insanity are diagnosed as psychotic.” GARY B. MELTON,
JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, RANDY K. OTTO, DOUGLAS
MOSSMAN & LOIS O. CONDIE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS § 8.02, at 206 (4th ed. 2018). “Psychosis”
is not a specific mental disorder but rather is a constellation of symptoms including
hallucinations, delusions, and illogical thinking. This term is often used as a synonym for
“‘madness’ and ‘craziness.’” Michael S. Moore, The Quest for a Responsible Responsibility
Test: Norwegian Insanity Law After Breivik, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 645, 685 (2015).
6. Persecutory delusions are particularly common in insanity cases. See infra notes 245–
249.
7. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 59 (1967); Moore, supra note 5, at
685.
8. See FEDERICA COPPOLA, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN AND THE GUILTY MIND Ch. 5, Pt V.
(2021).
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Appreciating the significance of the aims of this Article requires understanding
how insanity cases are litigated, how delusions currently factor into sanity
assessments, and why the role of delusions may be limited. In a typical case, before
raising an insanity defense, the defendant will be evaluated by a forensic
psychiatrist.9 If the forensic opinion supports an insanity verdict, which is rare,10 the
defense attorney will file a notice to plead the defense.11 At that point, the state will
have the opportunity to examine the defendant with a forensic examiner.12 The vast
majority of insanity acquittals are reached through plea agreement.13 However, if
sanity is contested, the defendant may proceed to trial. Expert mental health
testimony will be crucial to each side’s case.14 Studies suggest this testimony may be
minimal and conclusory15: after qualification, a defense attorney may simply ask the

9. Most states permit psychologists or other mental health professionals to serve this
function. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 133; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(d) (providing for a
court-ordered examination by a “mental health expert”).
10. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 200 (observing that forensic evaluators conclude
the defendant is insane less than fifteen percent of the time).
11. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.1.
12. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(d); GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.5; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 704-404(2)(c) (2020).
13. MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 200 (discussing research finding “in most
jurisdictions well over 70% of . . . insanity acquittals resulted from a plea-bargaining or quasiplea-bargaining arrangement rather than a full-fledged jury trial”); see Janet I. Warren,
Lawrence Fitch, Park Elliott Dietz & Barry D. Rosenfeld, Criminal Offense, Psychiatric
Diagnosis, and Psycholegal Opinion: An Analysis of 894 Pretrial Referrals, 19 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 63, 67 (1991) (“It is widely acknowledged that evaluation reports
supporting insanity routinely are used in plea bargaining and that, faced with the prospect of
a contested insanity trial, prosecutors often prefer to reduce the charge or perhaps recommend
a desirable treatment disposition in exchange for a plea of guilty.”).
14. See infra notes 402–405.
15. “[Psychologist] testimony on direct examination will ordinarily be based on their
written report . . . .” IRVING B. WEINER & ALLEN K. HESS, THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY 639 (2006). Experts in the field largely agree on the way that evaluations should
be conducted, including the types of information that should be considered in forming an
opinion regarding the defendant’s sanity. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 240–49; IRA K.
PACKER, EVALUATION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 95–126 (2009); Jeffrey S. Janofsky, Anne
Hanson, Philip J. Candilis, Wade C. Myers & Howard Zonana, AAPL Practice Guideline for
Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendant’s Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S21–S26 (2014). However, in practice, adherence to standards is often
poor; other than the forensic interview of the defendant, forensic clinicians demonstrate a
startling lack of uniformity in consulting other sources of information. See Janet I. Warren,
Daniel C. Murrie, Preeti Chauhan, Park E. Dietz & James Morris, Opinion Formation in
Evaluating Sanity at the Time of the Offense: An Examination of 5175 Pretrial Evaluations,
22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 171, 181 tbl.3 (2004); Tess M.S. Neal, Discerning Bias in Forensic
Psychological Reports in Insanity Cases, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 325, 332–33 (2018); PACKER,
supra, at 61–63 (reviewing studies highlighting issues with adequacy of information). Studies
demonstrate that failures to address psycholegal components of criminal responsibility or
provide underlying rationale for opinions are not uncommon. See Kristen D. Fuger, Marvin
W. Acklin, Annie H. Nguyen, Lawrie A. Ignacio & W. Neil Gowensmith, Quality of Criminal
Responsibility Reports Submitted to the Hawaii Judiciary, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 272,
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expert for her conclusion on the defendant’s sanity, which the expert may then supply
without providing much of the underlying evidentiary basis.16 Training materials
suggest (and experts urge) that much more context should be given: a testifying
forensic expert should recount what methods she employed to evaluate the defendant
and why, what data she reviewed and what they showed, her diagnosis of the
defendant and its identifying characteristics, how those characteristics manifested in
the defendant’s thoughts and behavior around the time of the criminal act, and, if
permitted, the jurisdiction’s legal standard for insanity and the expert’s opinion on
the penultimate and ultimate issues.17 Indeed, some appellate opinions reflect this
more robust approach.18
While the latter approach is certainly more useful to a jury than the former, both
may suffer from a fundamental flaw: the discounting—or even overlooking—of
evidence of certain reasoning impairments that may be crucial to responsibility
assessment. Two phenomena account for this tendency in the context of crimes
driven by delusions: (1) an unduly narrow understanding of the capacities relevant
to a defendant’s ability to “know” the wrongfulness of her criminal act, and (2) a
tendency to treat the content of the delusion that allegedly drove a criminal act as
dispositive of the holder’s ability to “know” the act’s wrongfulness.
First, evidence suggests that some defense attorneys19 and forensic experts
uncritically accept that a defendant’s ability to “know” a criminal act’s wrongfulness

273 (2014); Thomas Grisso, Guidance for Improving Forensic Reports: A Review of Common
Errors, 2 OPEN ACCESS J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 102, 104, 110, 112 (2010). Further, although
studies suggest recent improvement in reporting, it is unclear whether testimony has been
similarly improved. See Fuger et al., supra, at 273, 277. Differences in assessment
methodology may contribute to the relatively low rates of agreement between examiners of a
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. See, e.g., id. at 276 (assessing a sample of
fifty cases—yielding 150 examiner reports—between 2006-2010 and finding unanimous
agreement between three examiners in only 46% of cases and agreement between two of three
examiners in 52% of cases); W. Neil Gowensmith, Daniel C. Murrie & Marcus T. Boccaccini,
How Reliable Are Forensic Evaluations of Legal Sanity?, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 98, 101 tbl.1
(2013) (considering a sample of 165 defendants, which included a total of 483 reports
submitted by a total of thirty-six examiners and finding that only 55.1% of cases reached a
unanimous agreement between three evaluators, while there was disagreement between
evaluators (i.e., at least one evaluator finding sanity and another finding insanity) in 35.2% of
cases).
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 94.
17. See 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, §§ 37–51 (June 2019 Update) (providing
model direct examination and testimony of a psychiatrist); RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W.
SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC PRACTICE: MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL LAW 73–
80 (2005) (providing tips and different organizational structures for direct testimony).
18. See People v. Romero, 105 N.E.3d 1048, 1058–60, 1061–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1557 (2019); People v. Hardig, No. 3-15-0292, 2017 WL 4251486, at *2–
4 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 22, 2017).
19. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 63–64 (arguing that the narrow view of the
M’Naghten standard results from its uncritical acceptance and presentation by counsel and
forensic psychiatrists who have “allow[ed] an unwarranted assumption of what the rule ‘must’
mean to govern their conception of the defense”); Cal. State Bd. of Corr., SPECIAL
COMMISSIONS ON INSANITY AND CRIMINAL OFFENDERS FIRST REPORT, First Report of the
Special Study Commissions on Problems of Insanity Relating to Criminal Offenders 23
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is determined only by her cognitive abilities such as perception and understanding.20
This perceived scope of knowing wrongfulness—the key functionality in about half
of existing insanity standards21—conflicts with the origins of this term and with the
current medical understanding of knowledge, which includes both the cognitive and
affective components of decision-making.22 Under legal actors’ cramped
understanding, capacities requisite to moral decision-making, such as emotion
regulation and appreciation of the interpersonal implications of a criminal act, are
irrelevant to sanity determination and, therefore, presumably inadmissible at trial.
Although “appreciate”—the term used in a slight majority of jurisdictions’ insanity
tests23—is typically recognized as permitting consideration of both cognitive and
affective impairments,24 evidence suggests the narrow understanding of “know” may
impact courtroom actors’ conception of “appreciate” as well.25
Second, court opinions and forensic publications suggest that, when a defendant’s
criminal act stemmed from a delusion, insanity may turn on the specific content of
that delusion, not the underlying disruption of reality testing indicated by its
manifestation or the reasoning impairments integral to its creation and

(1962), available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015016186085&view=1up
&seq=5 [https://perma.cc/RWA7-HT8M] (opining that “the ordinary jury,” “many
psychiatrists and many lawyers,” and “perhaps many judges” erroneously assume the term
“knowledge” only requires the defendant grasp an abstract proposition that the charged
conduct is wrongful).
20. See, e.g., Randy Borum, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, in EVALUATING
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 193, 204 (2d ed. 2003)
(“‘Knowledge of criminality’ of one’s act seems to require only that one has stored in memory,
and can retrieve, the fact that the act is prohibited by law.”); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 122
(“The fact that a defendant may be ‘able to verbalize [mechanically] the right answer to a
question’ e.g., to respond that murder is wrong . . . ‘is often taken as conclusive evidence that
he knew the nature and wrongfulness’ of his conduct.”). However, other forensic professionals
recognize that “know” may assume a broader meaning in insanity cases. See Michael P.
Maloney, Standards for Legal Insanity, in A CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 16, 20 (1985); RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, CONDUCTING INSANITY
EVALUATIONS 67 (2d ed. 2000) (“Much controversy persists on whether the word know refers
only to a cognitive or intellectual apprehension of the nature and quality of the act or its
wrongfulness, or to a more encompassing affective understanding as well.”) (emphasis in
original).
21. See infra Part II.A; see infra notes 74, 75, 83.
22. See infra Part II.A.1–2; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 49–50; Goldstein, supra note 4,
at 123; R. J. Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JURIS. 111, 120 & n.43 (1975).
23. See infra Part II.A; see infra note 73.
24. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 123–24.
25. See Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S.3, S.31, S.38 & tbl.1 (identifying jurisdictions’
insanity standards as M’Naghten or ALI “variants” and asserting that, when a M’Naghten
jurisdiction chooses to replace “know” with “appreciate,” the latter may be interpreted as
narrowly as the former); see also Federica Coppola, Motus Animi in Mente Insana: An
Emotion-Oriented Paradigm of Legal Insanity Informed by the Neuroscience of Moral
Judgments and Decision-Making, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (2019) (discussing
the “interpretive confusion” around the meaning of, and abilities to be considered under, the
term “appreciate”).
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maintenance.26 The stated justification for telescoping delusional evidence in this
way is a rule in M’Naghten’s Case called the “insane delusion rule.”27 This rule holds
that if a delusional defendant believed she faced a situation that would have qualified
her for a legal defense (such as self-defense) then the delusion demonstrates her
ignorance of the wrongfulness of the act.28 However, if the delusional content would
not provide a legal justification or excuse then the delusional defendant—without
additional evidence of cognitive dysfunction—should be liable for the crime.29 The
modern use of this rule contradicts the express limitations in M’Naghten: the rule
applied only to individuals with “partial delusion only, [who are] not in other respects
insane,”30 but today is applied to those with major mental illnesses carrying
numerous significant impairments, such as schizophrenia.31
Cases such as Rowl’s exemplify how the combination of a narrow, cognitive
understanding of “knowledge” and an exclusion of the reasoning impairments
associated with delusions may contribute to the conviction of a nonculpable
defendant. Rowl apparently understood the nature and quality of his act: he knew he
was stabbing a human being with a butcher knife and intended to inflict serious
bodily injury, if not death. The more difficult determination is whether Rowl
appreciated his action’s wrongfulness. Merely focusing on the content of his
delusions would lead to an affirmative answer: Rowl was motivated by paranoid
delusions, but had the situation been as he believed his act would not have been
justified in self-defense. The missing gun and ambiguous statement, if evaluated by
a typical person without a serious mental disorder, would not have suggested that
Rowl’s father posed an imminent, deadly threat at the moment of the stabbing.
Moreover, unless Rowl manifested evidence of formal thought disorder, forensic
experts would likely find his cognitive abilities intact enough to support a sanity
determination. On this basis, Rowl’s defense attorney—perhaps with the assistance
of a forensic evaluation—might deem Rowl a poor candidate for an insanity defense
and urge him to plead guilty to a lesser charge or favorable sentencing
recommendation. Or, if an insanity defense were pursued at trial, Rowl’s defense

26. See Brandon A. Yakush & Melinda Wolbransky, Insanity and the Definition of
Wrongfulness in California, 13 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. PRAC. 355, 360, 366–67 (2013); Robert L.
Goldstein, The Psychiatrist's Guide to Right and Wrong: Part II. A Systematic Analysis of
Exculpatory Delusions, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 61, 66–67 (1989) (representing
that the law largely neglects the defective reasoning process underlying delusions and instead
determines culpability assessments by “the specific content of . . . delusions and how it
comports with [a legal justification or excuse]”); see infra notes 213–219, 235. But see
MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 240 (asserting that, because “the governing legal doctrine is
amorphous . . . virtually any aspect of an individual’s personality may assume legal
relevance”).
27. See Regina v. M’Naghten (M’Nahgten’s Case), 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200,
211 (1843); see infra Part III.B.1.
28. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211; cf. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 17, at
200–01 (discussing delusional beliefs that may justify a defendant’s criminal conduct,
including self-defense or defense of others, officially sanctioned duties, misconstrued
exigencies that would qualify for the necessity defense, and command by a divine authority).
29. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211.
30. Id.
31. See infra note 233.
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attorney and expert witnesses may hamper its success by trying to fit the facts of
Rowl’s case into what they perceive as the strictures of the law.32
But these strategies could result in the conviction of a man undeserving of
punishment. A growing body of empirical research in cognitive and social
psychology as well as moral and social neuroscience suggests that acting within the
throes of a delusion—when the delusion provides the primary reason for that act and
particularly under conditions of stress—may itself indicate an inability to engage in
sound moral decision-making. If this is the case, Rowl’s conviction may be unjust.
This Article draws upon the history of the insanity defense and insights from the
psychological, psychiatric, and neuroscientific literatures to argue for jettisoning
rigid rules regarding delusional content and to propose a new way of assessing moral
incapacity in cases involving delusion-driven crime. The Article consists of three
Parts. Part I lays necessary legal groundwork. It examines existing affirmative
insanity defenses, their moral incapacity components, and their relationship to the
original M’Naghten standard. It highlights the “defect of reason” element in the
M’Naghten standard—and the implicit continuation of this rationality element into
modern incarnations of this test—which suggests the significance of reasoning
impairments (whether cognitive, emotional, or otherwise) to sanity assessment.
Part II details the range of cognitive and emotional impairments associated with
delusions and explores how these might contribute to a defendant’s inability to know,
or ignorance of, the wrongfulness of her criminal act.33 This examination
demonstrates the incoherence and fundamental unfairness of the current treatment of
delusions in moral incapacity assessments. This Part suggests three modifications of
current doctrine. First, it argues that the constellation of reasoning impairments
associated with delusions should factor into the assessment of a defendant’s inability
to know or appreciate wrongfulness. Second, it suggests that, when evaluating the
moral significance of a delusional defendant’s objectives, the defendant’s cognitive
and emotional impairments must factor into that assessment—not simply the warped
content of her delusions. Third, and most controversially, the Article suggests
recognizing a broader spectrum of potentially exculpatory delusional content. This
would equate to freeing delusional defendants from a rigid legal wrong standard and
moving to a standard recognizing the “gist” of perceived justifications and excuses.
Case law suggests this standard may be more consistent with societal morality and
notions of community justice, as well as more compatible with the scientific
understanding of delusions. Finally, in the conclusion, the Article addresses the
reforms needed in defense attitudes and practice to implement these proposals.

32. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 7-6.1, 307 (1989)
(detailing the “constellation of decision points” through which the terms used in an insanity
test (and their express interpretation) may impact the justice process).
33. Other scholars have also advanced the general argument that delusions’ primary
significance for responsibility lies more in their defective reasoning process than in their
content. See 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
160–62 (1883); Carl Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and Wrong,
14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 39–40 (1959); Goldstein, supra note 26, at 66.
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I. MODERN INSANITY STANDARDS AND THEIR ORIGINS
The origins and current usage of jurisdictions’ insanity tests demonstrate their
amenability to consideration of the reasoning impairments associated with delusions.
Modern insanity tests derive from those articulated in 1843 in M’Naghten’s Case and
in 1962 by the American Law Institute (ALI). In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten shot and
killed the private secretary to Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, believing him to be Sir
Robert.34 M’Naghten was under the delusion that killing Sir Robert would stop his
harassment and persecution by the Tories.35 When M’Naghten was acquitted on
grounds of insanity, outrage ensued.36 The House of Lords issued four questions to
the fifteen common law judges of England in an attempt to understand “the nature
and extent of the unsoundness of mind which would excuse the commission of a
felony of this sort.”37 In response, Chief Justice Tindal pronounced this standard for
criminal insanity:
[I]n all cases . . . to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.38
Until the mid-twentieth century, a substantial majority of states employed the
M’Naghten test, adopting it either by statute or recognizing its common law force.39
Over time, the narrowness of the M’Naghten standard drew criticism from courts,
legal academics, and psychiatrists.40 Critics argued three aspects of the test unduly
limited criminal irresponsibility: the singular focus on the cognitive capacity of
“knowledge,”41 the apparent requirement that impairment be total,42 and the neglect

34. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 201. For a book-length treatment of M’Naghten’s
Case, see RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF
DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN (1981). Controversy surrounds the spelling of Daniel M’Naghten’s
name. Id. at xi–xiii. This article uses “M’Naghten,” as his name was spelled in his English
legal case.
35. MORAN, supra note 34, at 10; see HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE 64 (1954).
36. Richard Moran, The Modern Foundation for the Insanity Defense: The Cases of
James Hadfield (1800) and Daniel McNaughtan (1843), in 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 31, 39–40 (Richard D. Lambert et al. eds., 1985).
37. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 202.
38. Id. at 210.
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2, at 165 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
40. For a collection of critiques of M’Naghten’s Case and its right-and-wrong test, see
WEIHOFEN, supra note 35, at 63–68; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616–20 (2d Cir.
1966).
41. See Simon E. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham,
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A. J. 793, 794 (1955); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870–72
(D.C. Cir. 1954), abrogated by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42. See infra note 93 and accompanying text; FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 112 (1964).
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of volition.43 Some contended the narrow scope placed “unrealistically tight
shackles” upon expert psychiatric testimony,44 while others observed that, even if
courts gave testifying experts wide latitude, jurors would naturally construe
“knowledge” “as referring to a simple awareness by the actor of his wrongdoing such
as would be manifested by a verbal acknowledgement on his part of the forbidden
nature of his conduct.”45 Thus, the common meaning of “knowledge” would lead
jurors, and ultimately forensic experts, to believe that only cognitive impairment was
relevant to the legal test.46
In response, the ALI approved a new test in 1962.47 Model Penal Code section
4.01 provides: “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.”48 This test retained the structure and overall thrust of the
M’Naghten test but broadened that standard by substituting “appreciate” for “know”
and specifying that impairment need only be “substantial.”49 In addition, the ALI
added a volitional component that permits acquittal for substantial inability to
conform one’s conduct to the law’s requirements.50
Several less substantive changes were intended to clarify and simplify the insanity
test. The ALI eliminated M’Naghten’s “nature and quality of the act” prong, while
retaining its wrongfulness aspect. This absorption made sense: a person who lacks
the ability to comprehend the nature of her act cannot understand its wrongfulness.51
The ALI also replaced M’Naghten’s “was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind” with “as a result of mental disease or defect.” No evidence
suggests the ALI eliminated the “defect of reason” component in response to
criticism that it inappropriately restricted the defense. Instead, it appears the phrase
was dropped as redundant.52 In essence, a “defect of reason” must be the mechanism
by which a “disease of the mind” could result in a person’s inability “to know.”53

43. See SHELTON GLUECK, CRIME AND CORRECTION: SELECTED PAPERS 153 (1952);
Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense¾ An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 771, 783 (1962). For a pithy summary of these and additional sources of psychiatric
dissatisfaction with the M’Naghten rule, see ALLEN, supra note 42, at 109–13.
44. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 619.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2, at 166 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
46. Id. at 167.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 hist. n., at 163 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
49. Id. “Substantial” means “a capacity of some appreciable magnitude when measured
by the standard of humanity in general, as opposed to the reduction of capacity to the vagrant
and trivial dimensions characteristic of the most severe afflictions of the mind.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 172 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 172 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
51. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753–54 (2006).
52. HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 178 (1972); see also
Stephen P. Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 129 n.26 (2018).
53. The validity of this argument is reflected in the Commentary to the Model Penal Code
§ 4.01, which construed “[t]he determination of responsibility under the M’Naghten test [to]
turn[] on whether the actor by reason of mental disease or defect did not know . . . .” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2, at 165–66 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
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Finally, the ALI test recognized only incapacity—not actual lack of
understanding—as providing a basis for insanity.54 Under the traditional M’Naghten
test, a defendant could demonstrate she “did not know” the wrongfulness of her act
in two ways. She could establish that a mental disease caused her to lack the cognitive
(and perhaps other)55 abilities necessary for acquiring knowledge that her act was
wrongful.56 Alternatively, she could establish that, at the moment of the offense, she
was ignorant of the wrongfulness of her act because of a mental disease.57 Under this
latter prong, a defendant could have the capacity to understand wrongfulness but
momentarily lack the intellectual awareness of the factual predicate necessary for her
act to be wrongful.58 The ALI test eliminated this second basis for insanity.59 The
ALI’s formulation in section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code was highly influential
and inspired legislative action in a majority of states across the country.60
After the acquittal of John Hinckley in 1982, however, the tide shifted again
toward a narrower definition of irresponsibility.61 Thirty-six states reformed their
insanity defenses, with four abolishing the defense completely.62 A number of
jurisdictions eliminated the volitional prong and required that impairment be total,
not substantial.63 In 1984, Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act, which
limited irresponsibility to an inability to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of one’s acts due to a “severe mental disease or defect.”64 A Senate
Report suggests that restricting mental diseases to those that are “severe” was
intended to disqualify “mere emotional processes” that could impair appreciation.65
The American Bar Association endorsed a similar standard in 1989 but specified that
an inability to appreciate wrongfulness must stem from a “mental disease or defect .
. . that substantially affected the mental or emotional processes of the defendant at
the time of the alleged offense.”66 As discussed below, jurisdictions’ current insanity
standards reflect aspects of the M’Naghten, ALI, and ABA approaches.

54.
55.
56.
57.

See PAUL H. ROBINSON, Insanity, in 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 173 (2009).
See infra note 96.
See M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843).
See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 299, 311 (John Deigh & David
Dolinko eds., 2011) (“Although the M'Naghten rule hinged on actual knowledge rather than
ability to know, the criminal law clearly should not excuse agents who do not happen to know
that their acts are wrong if those agents could be reasonably expected to know that their acts
are wrong.”).
58. See id.
59. This linguistic shift has largely escaped attention. See Garvey, supra note 52, at 130
n.27.
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 5, at 175–76 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
61. See Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S6–S8.
62. See id. at S7; see infra note 67.
63. See Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S6–S7, S66.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
65. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 229 (1983).
66. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 32, at 330 (Standard 7-6.1).
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A. Analysis of Current Insanity Standards
As set forth in Appendix A, forty-eight jurisdictions currently provide an
affirmative defense of insanity.67 All but three of these jurisdictions recognize “moral
incapacity,” that is, they designate as insane a defendant who did not understand the
wrongfulness of her criminal act due to mental disease or defect.68 Moral incapacity
appears in two formulations. Thirty-four jurisdictions hold insane a person who was
“unable” or substantially “lacked the capacity” to appreciate (or know or recognize)
the wrongfulness of her act.69 Eleven additional jurisdictions excuse for ignorance of
wrongfulness (e.g., the defendant “did not know what he was doing was wrong”).70
This Article assesses how the science of delusions should factor into both lack-ofcapacity and ignorance-of-wrongfulness tests. Importantly, these two forms of moral
incapacity matter little in practice: sanity inquiries are typically resolved by
demonstrating the defendant knew her act was wrong.71 For organizational purposes,

67. See Appendix. In addition to those defenses included in the table, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, and Alaska have unique formulations. See Appendix note 1. Four states—
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah—abolished their affirmative insanity defenses but permit
mental health evidence to rebut the mens rea of charged offenses. See Appendix n.1. In
addition, Alaska limits its affirmative defense of insanity to cognitive incapacity, see ALASKA
STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (2018), and permits mental health evidence to rebut the state of mind
element of the offense, see id. § 12.47.020. In Kahler v. Kansas, the U.S. Supreme Court found
these practices (which it equated) consistent with due process. 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1037 (2020).
68. See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1022 (defining “moral incapacity test”). A total of forty-six
jurisdictions provide for acquittal whenever the defendant can establish her moral incapacity
at the moment of the offense. See Appendix n.1. Forty-three states, plus the federal
government and the District of Columbia, explicitly recognize moral incapacity in their
insanity tests. See Appendix. To capture the appropriate degree of understanding, jurisdictions
use terms such as “appreciate,” “know,” and “recognize,” among others. See Appendix. In
addition, New Hampshire’s “product test” is broad enough to encompass moral incapacity.
See State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1034 (N.H. 2006) (“A defendant asserting an insanity
defense must prove two elements: first, that at the time he acted, he was suffering from a
mental disease or defect; and, second, that a mental disease or defect caused his actions.”).
69. See Appendix (see “Incapacity” column of “Moral Incapacity” set of columns).
70. These jurisdictions include Arizona, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. See Appendix. These states
incorporate incapacity by implication, i.e., if a person was unable to know the wrongfulness
of her act (incapacity), she would necessarily not know it (actual ignorance) at a particular
moment in time. In contrast, one state recognizes actual ignorance and an inability to
understand wrongfulness. See Cheney v. State, 909 P.2d 74, 90 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
71. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 109 (“In the majority of insanity referrals, the defendant’s
objectives include a clear recognition of wrongfulness. In the remaining cases, the forensic
practitioner must evaluate closely the defendant’s awareness of wrongfulness and its role in
conducting the acts in question.”). Some commentators have argued that ignorance of the law
is an implicit requirement for irresponsibility under incapacity statutes. See Garvey, supra note
52, at 130 (“What defeats liability . . . is an actor’s ignorance of the law, provided it resulted
from a mental disease or defect, and provided he was powerless to be anything but ignorant.”)
(emphasis in original). Others disagree. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, Insanity, in 2 CRIM. L. DEF. §
173 (July 2021 update) (observing “there is no reason to believe that whenever a dysfunction
is sufficient to cause a loss of ‘substantial capacity to appreciate’ that it necessarily will in fact
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however, this Article will treat assessments of lack of capacity and of ignorance of
wrongfulness as distinct.72
Standards diverge beyond these primary means of determining moral
blamelessness. Jurisdictions differ in their key functionality: nearly two dozen
jurisdictions pin insanity on incapacity to “appreciate” wrongfulness;73 slightly more
than a dozen states premise insanity on a defendant’s inability to “know” her act was
wrong;74 and nine states frame their test as inability to “distinguish” right from
wrong,75 with one state focusing on incapacity to “recognize” the wrongfulness of
her conduct.76 Twenty-nine jurisdictions suggest incapacity must be total (or at least
include no descriptor to indicate otherwise),77 while fifteen specify it need only be
substantial.78 Seven states dictate the relevant impairment must derive from a “defect
of reason.”79 In addition to moral incapacity, twenty jurisdictions include a
“cognitive incapacity” component, which assesses the defendant’s ability to
understand the nature and quality of her act,80 and sixteen include a volitional prong,

cause a sufficient lack of appreciation to satisfy the excusing condition;” thus “[t]he A.L.I. test
is deficient in its failure to recognize this distinction”).
72. See infra Sections A and B.
73. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri (“knowing
and appreciating”), Nevada, New York (“know or appreciate”), Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the federal system. See
Appendix.
74. These jurisdictions include Arizona, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma (“he does not know his acts are wrong and he is unable
to distinguish right from wrong with respect to his acts”), Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
and Virginia. See Appendix.
75. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington (“unable to tell right from wrong”). See
Appendix.
76. See Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 79 n.30 (D.C. 1976).
77. These include all “know” and “distinguishing” states, see supra notes 74 (“know”),
75 (“distinguish”), as well as a few states employing the term “appreciate,” see Appendix
(Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, and the federal
system).
78. Jurisdictions requiring only substantial incapacity to appreciate wrongfulness include
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of
Columbia. See Appendix. Rhode Island asks the trier of fact to assess whether “capacity . . .
[was] so substantially impaired that [the defendant] cannot justly be held responsible.” State
v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 12 n.10 (R.I. 2012). In addition to these jurisdictions, Vermont specifies
that the defendant must lack “adequate capacity.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(a) (2019).
79. These jurisdictions include Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See Appendix. All “defect of reason” states
condition insanity on ignorance of knowledge of wrongfulness or inability to distinguish right
from wrong. See id.
80. Jurisdictions recognizing cognitive incapacity include Alabama, California, Florida,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, and the federal system. See Appendix. Cognitive incapacity adds nothing to
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providing for acquittal on the basis of an inability to conform one’s conduct to the
requirements of law.81
B. Meaning of “Appreciate” and “Know”
Which impairments factor into a sanity evaluation largely depends upon the
meaning ascribed to “appreciate” and “know,” the terms generally chosen to convey
the necessary measure of a defendant’s understanding of a criminal act’s
wrongfulness.82 Roughly an equal number of jurisdictions employ each term in
practice, if not in the express language of their statutes.83
Twenty-three jurisdictions currently condition sanity on the ability to “appreciate”
the wrongfulness of a criminal act.84 The ALI chose the word “appreciate” to convey
the relevance of the gamut of capacities inherent in reasoning, including both
affective and cognitive abilities.85 Section 4.01 explains, “An individual’s failure to

moral incapacity. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
81. These jurisdictions include Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. See Appendix. In addition,
Georgia’s delusional compulsion statute provides: “A person shall not be found guilty of a
crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person,
because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a
delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the
crime.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2020). Georgia courts have limited the application of this
test to delusions that, if true, would have legally justified or excused the defendant’s actions.
See Lawrence v. State, 454 S.E.2d 446, 450 (Ga. 1995); Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at
Part II.B.1 (discussing how Georgia’s statute has been utilized over time). As the focus of this
Article is delusions’ effect on moral incapacity, it does not separately address their effect on
volition. Numerous scholars have argued that impairments in cognition cannot easily be
separated from volition, however, and, for that reason, some have argued that volition is
inherently part of M’Naghten’s moral incapacity test. See STEPHEN, supra note 33, at 170–71.
Regardless, impairments associated with delusions are clearly relevant to volitional insanity.
See id. at 167–68. Indeed, studies show that psychosis and delusions often contribute to
findings of volitional impairment in insanity assessments. See Andrew Donohue, Vinay Arya,
Lawrence Fitch & Debra Hammen, Legal Insanity: Assessment of the Inability to Refrain, 5(3)
PSYCHIATRY 58, 63 (2008) (finding that psychotic disorders were the most common diagnoses
in forty-four defendants found volitionally, but not cognitively, impaired and that delusional
beliefs were the most commonly cited factor connecting the defendant’s mental illness to the
offense in these forensic evaluations).
82. See Appendix. Psychosis could also affect a defendant’s understanding of the nature
and quality of her act, but, in doing so, would also affect her comprehension of its
wrongfulness. See supra note 51.
83. While the insanity tests of only thirteen jurisdictions include the term “know,” supra
note 74, states conditioning insanity on an inability to distinguish or tell right from wrong
typically interpret this language in accordance with the M’Naghten standard. See supra note
75; People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 913 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Oct. 27, 2015); Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 326–27 (1847); State v. Nicholson, 466
P.2d 181, 182–83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
84. See Appendix.
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 app. C, at 212 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (discussing the

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 322

1/24/22 9:05 AM

2022]

CASE FOR MORAL WRONGFULNESS

311

appreciate the criminality of his conduct may consist in a lack of awareness of what
he is doing or a misapprehension of material circumstances, or a failure to apprehend
the significance of his actions in some deeper sense.”86 Herbert Wechsler, chief
reporter for the Model Penal Code, described the standard this way in his model jury
charge: “To appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct is, in short, to realize that it is
wrong; to understand the idea as a matter of importance and reality; to grasp it in a
way that makes it meaningful in the life of the individual, not as a bare abstraction
put in words.”87 Jurisdictions following the ALI’s example give “appreciate” wide
breadth and tend to permit consideration of any cognitive or emotional impairment
relevant to reasoning, judgment, and evaluation of the moral nature of one’s act.88
Consistent with this practice, forensic experts tend to recognize that “appreciate . . .
encompass[es] affective dimensions of major mental illness” and “take[s] into
account all aspects of the defendant’s mental and emotional functioning relating to
an ability to recognize and understand the significance of personal actions.”89
The meaning of “know” is more contested than “appreciate” and over time has
been a source of fervent disagreement.90 Many commentators have asserted that
“know” must refer only to cognitive abilities,91 given contemporary understandings
of rationalism at the time M’Naghten was decided.92 Moreover, some have argued
that “inability to know” can only be satisfied by total impairment of cognitive
processes, or by “totally deteriorated, drooling, hopeless psychotics of long standing,

importance of reason to justness of blame); id. § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 169; id. § 4.01 cmt. 2, at 166.
86. Id. § 4.01, explanatory n., at 164.
87. Id. § 4.01, app. C, at 215.
88. See, e.g., State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (Idaho 1969) (holding that “appreciate”
allows for consideration of emotional and cognitive knowledge); State v. Dyer, 518 P.2d 184,
186 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that “the word ‘appreciate’ allows psychiatric testimony
regarding emotional as well as intellectual cognition of the criminality of the conduct”); People
v. Engram, 549 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting expert testimony concerning
the “marked separation of the act from the emotions and from logical thinking,” the
defendant’s “emotional blunting,” and her “inability to conduct her behavior in a way that
would be appropriate,” to “recognize cause and effect,” to use “appropriate judgment,” and to
“understand the consequences of her behavior”); People v. Hernandez-Beltre, 69 N.Y.S.3d
336, 338 (App. Div. 2018) (considering expert testimony that “in the context of his delusional
beliefs, disorganized thinking, religious preoccupation, and his hallucinatory state . . . the
thought resulted in no more than a surface awareness, without depth or emotional
significance”).
89. Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S7.
90. For a lucid and pithy presentation of the variance in meanings, see RICHARD J. BONNIE,
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW, A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL
OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 12 (3d ed. 2008). For an overview of disagreement among scholars,
see COPPOLA, supra note 8, at 22–24.
91. See Arval A. Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REV. 583, 605 (1968) (assessing
the term “know” and concluding: “[T]he test is heavily intellectualistic, and from a
psychological point of view, narrow because the cognitive becomes the single, important
criterion of criminal responsibility.”); Gerber, supra note 22, at 120–22; COPPOLA, supra note
25, at 14–15, 26 (concluding “standards such as the M’Naghten rule do not consider emotional
capacity at all”).
92. See Gerber, supra note 22, at 121.
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and congenital idiots.”93 Under this interpretation, an act motivated by pathological
reasoning or impulses would be deemed sane so long as the defendant understood in
an intellectual sense that her action was wrong.94 Disordered reasoning is the
predominant form of irrationality of those with severe mental illness, so the majority
of the most seriously ill whose criminal acts stem from irrationality would not qualify
for the insanity defense under this conception of “know.”95
However, properly understood, “know” and “appreciate” should carry similar
meanings and encompass the same abilities.96 Crucially, M’Naghten made clear that
“knowledge” must be the product of rational thinking.97 The opinion dictates that, to
qualify for insanity, a defendant must prove that a “disease of the mind” produced
“such a defect of reason” that she did not “know” the act’s wrongfulness.98 The
opinion also conditions criminal responsibility on sufficiency of reason.99 Therefore,
although scholars have contended to the contrary,100 consideration of “knowledge”
should extend beyond cognition to include any ability requisite to rational decisionmaking, including affective capacities.101
It appears that modern courts largely agree.102 Courts that define “know” or
explore its meaning in case law typically, though not always,103 give the term broad

93. GREGORY ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 273 (1943).
94. Morris, supra note 91, at 606 n.113.
95. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 810 (1985).
96. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Mass. 1967) (“We think that
the use of ‘appreciate’ rather than ‘know’ expresses what the word ‘know’ in the classical
statement of the rule means in the light of modern knowledge. Many psychiatrists, as indicated
in the records in recent cases, appear to have recognized this.”). A number of scholars have
advocated for a broad conception of “knowledge.” See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at
1791 n.66 (listing some of these scholars).
97. FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 198.
98. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843); see
FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 198, 210–11.
99. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210.
100. See supra note 91.
101. See supra note 96. “Reasoning” and “rationality” are normative concepts best left to
the common sense of the jury. See FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 203. However, some scholars
have attempted to provide working definitions. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and
Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 255 (2000) (defining rationality as “the general ability
to recognize and be responsive to the good reasons that should guide action”); FINGARETTE,
supra note 52, at 186–94 (defining rationality as the ability to respond relevantly to anything
essentially relevant to one’s action, including its physical and moral aspects).
102. See infra notes 104–116. Some evidence suggests that forensic evaluators share this
perspective. See Robert M. Wettstein, Edward P. Mulvey & Richard Rogers, A Prospective
Comparison of Four Insanity Defense Standards, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 21, 21–27 (1991)
(finding that forensic psychiatrists’ assessments did not vary when using the ALI and
M’Naghten).
103. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Pa. 1987) (holding that to construe
“knowledge” as including an appreciation of the social and emotional implications of an act
“either misperceives the nature of the M’Naghten test or seeks to fundamentally alter it”);
State v. Everett, 520 P.2d 301, 305 (Ariz. 1974) (en banc).
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meaning.104 Some courts have held that knowledge requires an ability to
“understand,”105 a term that at least one court has held allows “a full range of
testimony as to emotional as well as intellectual cognition of the act.”106 Others have
interpreted knowing wrongfulness as requiring an ability to “appreciate” the
character and consequences of one’s act.107 While many courts stress that the
“appreciation” intended by “knowledge” includes a range of cognitive capacities,108
some expressly consider emotional appreciation. For instance, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota endorsed this language of the American Law Report when construing its
traditional M’Naghten insanity standard:
It seems clear . . . in the light of current medical and psychiatric
information, that the ability to ‘know’ right from wrong should no longer
be presented to jury or witness in the exclusively intellectual sense . . .
but that the test should be the accused’s ability to emotionally and
intellectually realize and appreciate, as an integrated personality, the
nature and consequences of the moral choice presented, and that the mere
ability to verbalize a correct answer to questions about the distinction
should not be accepted as conclusive on the issue of criminal
responsibility.109

104. See People v. Horn, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 132 (Ct. App. 1984) (“In sum, what the [right
from wrong] clause requires is incapacity, due to serious mental disease, to make the relevant
valuations of a normal adult—to realize, for instance, that it is wrong to kill a human being or
take his property. . . . It expresses in plain words an abiding insight into what is paramount in
human nature.”).
105. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747 (2006); Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 571
(Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Singleton, 48 A.3d 285, 293 (N.J. 2012); see infra note 106
(providing additional examples).
106. State v. Dyer, 518 P.2d 184, 186 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); see also People v. Wolff, 394
P.2d 959, 962–63 (Cal. 1964) (recognizing “the California courts have attempted to give a
psychologically sound recognition to the depth and insight required of a defendant’s
knowledge” and approving an instruction that asks if the defendant had sufficient mental
capacity to “understand that [his act] was wrong and a violation of the rights of another”)
(emphasis in original).
107. Moore, supra note 5, at 680. According to Abraham Goldstein, trial courts in eleven
states instruct juries that knowledge means understanding that enables a person to judge “the
nature, character, and consequences of the act charged against him” or the “capacity to
appreciate the character and to comprehend the probable or possible consequences of his act.”
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 49–50; see, e.g., State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505, 521–22 (Wis.
1962) (recognizing that “distinguishing between right and wrong” requires “real insight” to
“be able to make a normal moral judgement” and “appreciate and evaluate” an act at the time
committed); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 761 (Cal. 1985) (explaining that “‘knowing’ in
the sense of being able to verbalize the concepts of right and wrong [is] insufficient to establish
legal sanity[;] [r]ather, the defendant must ‘know’ in a broader sense—he must appreciate or
understand these concepts”).
108. See supra note 107.
109. State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 790 (Minn. 1972) (quoting with approval 45
A.L.R.2d 1447, 1450).
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Reflecting M’Naghten’s emphasis on reasoning,110 courts have also recognized
that knowledge requires rationality and a sufficient capacity to reason.111 Some
courts have even recognized the relevance of volitional impairments to a defendant’s
ability to know the wrongfulness of her acts.112 Given how broadly courts have
interpreted “know” in practice, some have observed that the ALI test “is essentially
the M’Naghten rule with respect to the actor’s knowledge of his acts.”113 Many states
prefer to leave the interpretation of “know” to jurors’ common sense.114 However,
courts overwhelmingly give forensic witnesses broad latitude to testify to the
defendant’s mental condition (including cognitive, affective, and volitional
impairments)115 and have indicated their appreciation for detailed testimony about
defendants’ capabilities.116 Thus, courts permit jurors in “know” jurisdictions—as in
“appreciate” jurisdictions117—to learn of, and consider, the full panoply of a
defendant’s reasoning impairments. Yet, hampered by misconceptions of the breadth

110. See M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722–23, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843).
111. See, e.g., Skinner, 704 P.2d at 762–63 (“If he has reasoning capacity sufficient to
distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he is doing, knowledge and
consciousness that what he is doing is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment,
he must be held responsible for his conduct.”); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn.
1930) (“The general rule is that if a defendant has capacity and reason to enable him to
distinguish the difference between right and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing, he
is criminally responsible for such act.”); State v. Davies, 148 A.2d 251, 255 (Conn. 1959) (“To
be the subject of punishment, an individual must have mind and capacity, reason and
understanding enough to enable him to judge of the nature, character and consequence of the
act charged against him, that the act is wrong and criminal, and that the commission of it will
justly and properly expose him to penalty.”); Rawland, 199 N.W.2d at 785 (“The defendant
will be excused if at the time of the criminal act he had a mental disease or defect which
included among its symptoms or consequences an impairment in one or more of the
psychological functions requisite for reasoning (i.e., cognitive ego functions [perceiving,
remembering, classifying, judging, etc.]) which, in turn, reduced the strength of his disposition
to token ‘this is wrong’ to a negligibly low value . . . .” (quoting Joseph M. Livermore & Paul
E. Meehl, The Virtues of M’Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 808 (1966)). Indeed, the examples
provided in M’Naghten—when differentiating between motivations that would inculpate and
those that would exculpate under the insane delusion rule—demonstrate the importance of
intact reasoning abilities. See M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211 (distinguishing between
killing for self-defense and for revenge).
112. See Rawland, 199 N.W.2d at 785; State v. Putzell, 242 P.2d 180, 184 (Wash. 1952)
(en banc); Arridy v. People, 82 P.2d 757, 761 (Colo. 1938).
113. State v. Dyer, 518 P.2d 184, 186 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
114. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 50 (noting that, in nineteen jurisdictions, “the jury is
simply given the words of the rule, without explanation, and left to find the ‘common sense’
meaning from their own backgrounds or from the materials presented to them at trial”).
115. See id. at 53–54 (“There is virtually no support in law for the view that M’Naghten is
responsible for inhibiting the flow of testimony on the insanity issue. . . . The almost unvarying
policy of the courts has been to admit any evidence of aberrational behavior so long as it is
probative of the defendant’s mental condition, without regard to the supposed restrictions of
the test used to define insanity for the jury.”) (emphasis in original).
116. See State v. Shoffner, 143 N.W.2d 458, 463–64 (Wis. 1966); Pope v. United States,
372 F.2d 710, 736–37 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (per curiam).
117. See supra note 88.
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of these terms, legal and forensic professionals may not bring reasoning impairments
associated with delusions to jurors’ attention.
II. NOT KNOWING AN ACT’S WRONGFULNESS
Determinations of moral incapacity often turn on the effects of psychosis,
including delusions, and a defendant’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of her
criminal act. Herbert Fingarette observed, “Paranoid delusion is a classic paradigm
of insanity, both historically, as the occasion for historic and leading legal rulings,
and practically, as representing a sizable proportion of the symptoms of mental
disorder at issue when the insanity plea is raised.”118 Indeed, the most impactful cases
in insanity jurisprudence have involved paranoia or schizophrenia-related disorders
characterized by delusions.119 Today, lawyers, psychiatrists, and the public recognize
psychosis as the quintessential embodiment of insanity.120 Thus, understanding the
range of impairments associated with delusions—and their relevance to the criteria
of insanity—is central both to the conception of insanity and the operation of the
defense.
Forensic experts tend to adopt one of two perspectives regarding the use of
delusions in insanity cases. In most jurisdictions, they will factor delusions into the
moral incapacity test,121 stressing how delusions impair the defendant’s ability to
distinguish subjective experience from the reality of the external world.122 Although
infrequently reflected in appellate opinions, testimony may include discussion of
delusions’ effects on attention, perception, reflective awareness, reasoning, and
judgment.123 In essence, if a defendant is incapable of accurately perceiving and
rationally responding to the physical and morally relevant aspects of her action,124

118. FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 137–38.
119. See WEIHOFEN, supra note 35, at 105; GLUECK, supra note 43, at 156 n.38.
120. See Moore, supra note 5, at 689 (“The most familiar forms of mental disease that are
so seriously deranging of the qualities of personhood that they render those who suffer them
non-responsible, are, as it happens, those psychiatrists for over 150 years have called
psychoses.”); Borum, supra note 20, at 206 (“Typically, courts have determined that the
condition must be characterized by a severe disorder of thought or mood and, typically, must
interfere with one’s capacity accurately to perceive reality.”); cf. MELTON ET AL., supra note
5, at 227, 228 tbl.8.1 (displaying characteristics of individuals found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI) in eight studies and concluding that “these data . . . suggest that suffering
from a psychosis is usually required for the insanity defense to succeed”).
121. See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1795 n.80.
122. The effect of delusions on defendants’ sense of reality is a frequent topic of expert
testimony. See State v. Currie, 812 So. 2d 128, 134 (La. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Demagall,
978 N.Y.S.2d 416, 421 (App. Div. 2014); People v. Plackowska, No. 2-17-1015, 2020 WL
4463108, *20–27 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 3, 2020).
123. See infra notes 139–145 (discussing types of disordered reasoning associated with
schizophrenia); State v. Dye, 776 N.W.2d 302, *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009); State v. Gerone,
435 So. 2d 1132, 1134, 1137 (La. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Young, 479 N.E.2d 815, 817
(N.Y. 1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 132 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); People v. Moore,
Nos.1-16-1117 & 1-16-2850, 2019 WL 3779772, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 9, 2019).
124. FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 186–94 (defining rationality as the ability to respond
relevantly (even if foolishly) to anything essentially relevant to one’s action, including its
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she cannot fairly be expected to comport with the requirements of law.125 In a
minority of states, delusional content has less relevance and may only support a
defendant’s insanity defense if it would have justified or excused the defendant’s act
had it been true.126
However, a growing body of research in the cognitive sciences suggests that
delusions hold additional import. Notably, the very existence of delusions could
signal a disordered process of rational thinking capable of impairing moral decisionmaking.127 Exaggerated cognitive biases and emotional impairments appear across
delusion subtypes,128 so they may provide additional grist (beyond warped content)
for moral incapacity in a broad range of cases. Moreover, an additional set of
attentional and attributional biases relevant to paranoid psychosis suggests the legal
system should pay increased attention to delusions of impending harm, including
those that would not constitute a legal justification or excuse. The Sections below
detail how the cognitive and emotional aberrations associated with delusions may
bear on a defendant’s inability to understand—and her actual ignorance of—the
wrongfulness of her criminal act. They also explore the implications of this science
for the evolution of the law and the practice of defense attorneys and forensic mental
health professionals.
A. Incapacity to Know or Appreciate Wrongfulness
Most insanity standards assess the capacity of a defendant to “appreciate” or
“know” the wrongfulness of her criminal act.129 As Part I established, the origin and
modern judicial interpretation of these terms demonstrate the centrality of reasoning
abilities to sanity.130 Often, an individual with psychosis will exhibit a range of
significant cognitive impairments that affect reasoning.131

physical and moral aspects).
125. See id. at 230.
126. See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1795–98, 1813–17 (discussing the treatment
of delusions in Nevada and California); see infra notes 227–240 and accompanying text
(discussing the insane delusion rule).
127. For a review of these impairments, see Part III of Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2.
128. See Philippa A. Garety, Matthew Gittins, Suzanne Jolley, Paul Bebbington, Graham
Dunn, Elizabeth Kuipers, David Fowler & Daniel Freeman, Differences in Cognitive and
Emotional Processes Between Persecutory and Grandiose Delusions, 39 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 629, 635–37 (2012). Researchers note that “surprisingly few studies have examined
whether biased reasoning generalises across delusion sub-types (e.g., grandiose, ideas of
reference) or if some types are more highly associated than others.” George Savulich,
Sukhwinder Shergill & Jenny Yiend, Biased Cognition in Psychosis, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 514, 521 (2012).
129. To be more precise, thirty-four jurisdictions assess the ability or capacity of the
defendant to appreciate, know, or recognize the wrongfulness of her act, or to distinguish right
from wrong with reference to the particular act charged. See Appendix.
130. See supra Part I.B.
131. See Savulich et al., supra note 128, at 516 (collecting studies).
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Schizophrenia, the best known and most researched form of psychotic disorder,132
offers a prime example.133 This severe and debilitating mental illness is characterized
by delusions,134 hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or
catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms such as diminished emotional
expression.135 The vast majority of individuals with schizophrenia exhibit an array
of cognitive dysfunctions, including impaired processing speed, attention, executive
ability, verbal fluency, and working memory.136 These impairments, assessed using
traditional neuropsychological and IQ measures, are generally at or above one
standard deviation relative to community comparison groups.137 However, twenty to
twenty-five percent of individuals with schizophrenia do not display global cognitive
impairments.138
Robert Schopp has detailed four types of disordered cognitive processes
associated with schizophrenia that can lead to distorted understanding and decisionmaking.139 First, schizophrenia manifests in impaired reality relatedness, which
includes “the capacity to accurately perceive the external world (reality testing) and

132. See Suzanne Ho-wai So, Nicolson Yat-fan Siu, Hau-lam Wong, Wai Chan & Philippa
Anne Garety, ‘Jumping to Conclusions’ Data-Gathering Bias in Psychosis and Other
Psychiatric Disorders – Two Meta-Analyses of Comparisons Between Patients and Healthy
Individuals, 46 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 151, 161 app. A (2016); P. A. Garety & D. Freeman,
The Past and Future of Delusions Research: From the Inexplicable to the Treatable, 203 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 331 (2013).
133. See Christopher R. Bowie & Philip D. Harvey, Cognitive Deficits and Functional
Outcome in Schizophrenia, 2 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 531, 531–36 (2006)
(reviewing cognitive deficits in schizophrenia).
134. A large majority of individuals with schizophrenia experience delusions over the
course of their illness. See Michael V. Bronstein, Gordon Pennycook, Jutta Joormann, Philip
R. Corlett & Tyrone D. Cannon, Dual-Process Theory, Conflict Processing, and Delusional
Belief, 72 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 1, 1 (2019); Benjamin F. McLean, Julie K. Mattiske & Ryan
P. Balzan, Association of the Jumping to Conclusions and Evidence Integration Biases with
Delusions in Psychosis: A Detailed Meta-Analysis, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 344, 346 (2016).
135. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 99–100 (5th ed. 2013).
136. See Dwight Dickinson, Jonathan Schaefer & Daniel R. Weinberger, The MultiFaceted, “Global” Cognitive Impairment Profile in Schizophrenia, in COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 24, 29 (Philip D. Harvey ed., 2013); Ronan O’Carroll, Cognitive
Impairment in Schizophrenia, 6 ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 161, 162 (2000). For
example, a 2000 literature review concluded that up to seventy-five percent of patients with
schizophrenia suffer significant cognitive impairment, including impaired function in
“memory, attention, motor skills, executive function [including such cognitive abilities as
attentional control, cognitive inhibition, inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive
flexibility] and intelligence.” O’Carroll, supra note 136, at 162.
137. R. Walter Heinrichs, Ashley A. Miles, Narmeen Ammari & Eva Muharib, Cognition
as a Central Illness Feature in Schizophrenia, in COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
1, 4–5 (Philip D. Harvey ed., 2013); see Dickinson et al., supra note 136, at 25.
138. See Heinrichs et al., supra note 137, at 5–6. It is possible, of course, that these
individuals display subtle deficits and lie near the bottom of normality for measures of
cognitive function, but they are not grossly impaired.
139. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 176–88 (1991).
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the individual’s relationship to it (reality sense).”140 Disordered reality testing results
in inaccurate perception and evaluation of external events, poor judgment, and
inappropriate responses.141 Second, schizophrenia correlates with various forms of
disordered reasoning, including thinking that is overgeneralized (drawing
conclusions without sufficient evidence) or combinative (generating impossible
beliefs from impressions or ideas).142 Third, schizophrenia results in impaired
cognitive focus, or the ability to select and attend to relevant aspects of a situation.143
Finally, schizophrenia is associated with disordered concept formation, which
presents as misinterpreting aspects of reality and imbuing facts with larger,
inappropriate significance.144 As a result of these distorted processes, the
“understanding, reasoning, judgment, and actions” of an individual with
schizophrenia “tend to be idiosyncratic and often maladaptive.”145
Accumulating knowledge in delusion research enriches understanding of the
complex of disordered cognitive processes associated with psychosis and could be
useful in deciphering a defendant’s choices and behavior in an insanity case. Recent
research in cognitive and social psychology, as well as cognitive and affective
neuroscience, has revealed an interlocking series of cognitive biases and emotional
impairments believed to contribute to the origin, maintenance, and increasing
severity of delusions.146 Whereas cognitive deficits involve impairment at the global
level, cognitive biases involve the selective processing of information.147 Particularly
important to psychosis are pathology-congruent biases that work to cement and
reinforce a pathological belief.148
1. Cognitive Biases
Comprehending the relationship of delusions to reasoning requires familiarity
with the leading framework of decision-making.149 In his groundbreaking book,

140. Id. at 187.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 186.
143. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 135, at 101.
144. SCHOPP, supra note 139, at 187.
145. Id. at 188.
146. See, e.g., Thomas Ward & Philippa A. Garety, Fast and Slow Thinking in Distressing
Delusions: A Review of the Literature and Implications for Targeted Therapy, 203
SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 80, 82–83 (2019) (suggesting an integrated cognitive-based model for
development and maintenance of delusional ideation); Garety & Freeman, supra note 132, at
329–31 (discussing hypotheses relating to the role of emotion in the genesis and maintenance
of delusions); McLean et al., supra note 134, at 350 (concluding that the cognitive biases
assessed “are not simply stable features of schizophrenia . . . [but rather] appear elevated
during times of worse delusions, and appear lower . . . or comparable to normal levels . . . as
delusions abate”).
147. See Savulich et al., supra note 128, at 516.
148. See id.
149. See Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 82–83 (proposing a hypothetical model that
integrates exaggerated reasoning biases in psychosis to the dual-process model of decisionmaking but noting that studies providing supporting evidence are “few in number and at an
early stage of methodological development”). The relationship of reasoning biases to the dual-
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Thinking Fast and Slow,150 psychologist Daniel Kahneman drew upon decades of
research to propose a model of decision-making that involves the interaction of
intuitive and analytical processes.151 This dual-process model posits the interplay of
“System 1” processing, which “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no
effort and no sense of voluntary control,” and “System 2” processing, which involves
conscious, analytic reasoning.152 The dual-process framework is sometimes referred
to as having a “default-interventionalist” structure, by which System 1 produces
intuition-based responses and System 2 reviews and, if necessary, modifies those
responses.153 Accordingly, System 1 regulates most everyday behaviors, while
System 2 has the option to effortlessly endorse those behaviors or intervene when it
disagrees or to suggest a course of action in the first instance.154
Cognitive neuroscientist Joshua Greene and colleagues have applied Kahneman’s
dual-process model to moral decision-making.155 Greene’s moral decision-making
model centers around the competition between a “social-emotional” pathway, which
mirrors System 1, and a “cognitive” pathway, which mirrors System 2.156 Others
refined this model to emphasize the dynamic nature of the interactions between the
two pathways.157 Researchers have tested Greene’s model using moral probes, which
involve analyzing a lethal scenario to decide whether to commit a harmful act in
order to maximize the possible number of lives saved.158 Moral probes elicit an

process model of decision-making is hypothetical and contested. See Fiery Cushman, Action,
Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. REV. 273 (2013) (suggesting shifting away from a dual-process model in favor of
reinforcement-learning model, which includes more complex interactions between Systems 1
and 2); Oriel FeldmanHall, Dean Mobbs, Davy Evans, Lucy Hiscox, Lauren Navrady & Tim
Dalgleish, What We Say and What We Do: The Relationship Between Real and Hypothetical
Moral Choices, 123 COGNITION 434, 440 (2012) (“[O]ur moral beliefs may have a much
weaker impact on our decision-making if the context is enriched with other compelling
motivational forces, such as the presence of a significant self-gain.”).
150. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–30 (2011).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 20–21. But see Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith E. Stanovich, Dual-Process
Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate, 8 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 223, 227–35
(2013) (considering and responding to various criticisms of dual-process theories).
153. Evans & Stanovich, supra note 152, at 227.
154. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 150, at 39–49.
155. See Joshua D. Greene, Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley &
Jonathan D. Cohen, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment,
44 NEURON 389, 389 (2004). The dual-process model finds support in brain imaging studies
investigating the neural physiology of moral decision-making. See generally Beverley
Garrigan, Anna L.R. Adlam & Peter E. Langdon, The Neural Correlates of Moral DecisionMaking: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Moral Evaluations and Response
Decision Judgments, 108 BRAIN & COGNITION 88 (2016) (reviewing data from brain imaging
studies). Further discussion of the physiological underpinnings of the dual-process model is
beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses on behavioral outputs as they relate to
the capacity to form rational and reasoned moral judgments.
156. Greene et al., supra note 155, at 389, 393; see Cushman, supra note 149, at 285.
157. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 149, at 277–78.
158. See, e.g., Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, R. Kang-Xing Jin & John
Mikhail, A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications, 22 MIND AND
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intuitive resistance to commit harm (via System 1), which can be overcome by
consciously focusing on reaching a utilitarian outcome (via System 2)—that is,
saving the greatest number of lives possible.159
Research in cognitive psychiatry and neuroscience suggests that populations with
delusions may have difficulties modulating System 1 and System 2 processes.160 In
particular, delusional individuals may engage in more intuitive and automatic
processing and less conscious and deliberative decision-making relative to healthy
individuals.161 Researchers speculate that this disordered reasoning process may be
related to the host of systematic errors in thinking—or cognitive biases—associated
with delusions.162 These cognitive biases include a bias against disconfirmatory
evidence, a bias against confirmatory evidence, liberal acceptance, and a bias to
“jump to conclusions.”163
Meta-analyses and literature reviews reveal that a common trait among
populations with delusions is belief inflexibility, or a diminished tendency to engage
analytic reasoning to review beliefs or initial interpretations of events according to
available evidence. Belief flexibility is a meta-cognitive (higher order) reasoning
construct.164 Delusional individuals often exhibit an impaired ability to examine their
inaccurate beliefs, to alter them in response to reflection or new evidence, and to
generate and assess alternatives—a fact which, if explained to the jury, helps
corroborate beliefs about impending harm that most would consider unreasonable.165

LANGUAGE 1, 3–4, 7 (2007). The paradigmatic moral dilemma is the “trolley” dilemma, where
an out-of-control train is rapidly approaching five people standing on the tracks in its path.
Participants must decide whether to push a large man in front of the train, thus killing the man
but saving the five people on the track, or refrain from taking any action, which dooms the
five people in the train’s path but saves the large man. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt,
How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 519 (2002).
159. Id.; see Cushman, supra note 149, at 285.
160. See Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 82–83; William J. Speechley & Elton T.C.
Ngan, Dual-Stream Modulation Failure: A Novel Hypothesis for the Formation and
Maintenance of Delusions in Schizophrenia, 70 MED. HYPOTHESES 1210, 1211–13 (2008).
161. See Michael V. Bronstein, Jonas Everaert, Ariana Castro, Jutta Joormann & Tyrone
D. Cannon, Pathways to Paranoia: Analytic Thinking and Belief Flexibility, 113 BEHAV.
RSCH. & THERAPY 18, 18 (2019) (summarizing existing research and noting its tentative
nature); Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 83.
162. See Bronstein et al., supra note 161, at 22.
163. See McLean et al., supra note 134, at 344–45 (providing an overview of each of these
cognitive biases).
164. Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 81.
165. Chen Zhu, Xiaoqi Sun & Suzanne Ho-wai So, Associations Between Belief
Inflexibility and Dimensions of Delusions: A Meta-Analytic Review of Two Approaches to
Assessing Belief Flexibility, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 59, 60 (2017) (collecting studies
finding that 43-76% of individuals with non-affective psychosis were unable to consider the
possibility of having been mistaken about their delusions, reduce their delusional conviction
in face of hypothetical contradiction, and generate alternative explanations); Ward & Garety,
supra note 146, at 82 (reporting that studies have typically found around 50% of people with
delusions are unable to accept the possibility of being mistaken).
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A recent meta-analysis found a significant association between belief inflexibility
and global severity of delusions.166
Moreover, populations with delusions tend to show evidence-integration errors
unrelated to delusional content. Studies have found that populations with delusions
tend to exhibit a general bias against disconfirmatory evidence, or a bias against
revising an initial interpretation of an event when confronted with evidence contrary
to that interpretation.167 This bias, typically absent from the general population, is
associated with delusions regardless of diagnosis168 and tends to increase with
delusional severity.169 Two additional evidence-integration biases are associated
with delusions170: a bias against confirmatory evidence, in which individuals tend not
to acknowledge the increasing plausibility of a true interpretation despite additional
supporting evidence,171 and liberal acceptance, involving individuals’ overrating the
plausibility of absurd interpretations.172 Research suggests these three cognitive
biases are related parts of a single evidence-integration cognitive process.173 Taken
together, these cognitive biases reflect an impairment of a System 2 process—that is,
they impair an individual’s ability to consciously reflect on new information in order
to modify beliefs or behavior—that increases as delusion severity worsens.174
Finally, delusions are associated with the jumping-to-conclusions bias,175 a hasty
decision-making style in which a person makes “fully convinced decisions with little

166. Zhu et al., supra note 165, at 75.
167. McLean et al., supra note 134, at 349 (finding a greater association of bias against
disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) in groups with current delusions relative to groups without
current delusions, with a small effect size); Bronstein et al., supra note 134, at 5.
168. McLean et al., supra note 134, at 349. But see Jonas Everaert, Michael V. Bronstein,
Tyrone D. Cannon & Jutta Joormann, Looking Through Tinted Glasses: Depression and
Social Anxiety Are Related to Both Interpretation Biases and Inflexible Negative
Interpretations, 6 CLINICAL PSYCH. SCI. 517, 517 (2018) (finding that depression and social
anxiety were associated with reduced revision of negative interpretations by disconfirmatory
positive information).
169. McLean et al., supra note 134, at 350.
170. In a 2016 meta-analysis and systemic review, Benjamin McLean found that the
jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC), BADE, bias against confirmatory evidence (BACE), and
liberal acceptance (LA) “appear elevated during times of worse delusions, and appear lower
(BADE, BACE, LA) or comparable to normal levels (JTC) as delusions abate.” Id.
171. Id. at 345 (describing BACE as the failure to “adequately up-rate the plausibility of
the true interpretation despite additional supporting evidence”).
172. Id.; see also Steffen Moritz, Gerit Pfuhl, Thies Lüdtke, Mahesh Menon, Ryan P.
Balzan & Christina Andreou, A Two-Stage Cognitive Theory of the Positive Symptoms of
Psychosis: Highlighting the Role of Lowered Decision Thresholds, 56 J. BEHAV. THERAPY &
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 13–17 (2017) (providing a narrative review of studies
investigating liberal acceptance, which the authors describe as “reason[ing] like ‘bad
statisticians,’ that is, . . . assign[ing] meaning and momentum to weakly supported evidence”).
173. McLean et al., supra note 134, at 345, 352.
174. See Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 82.
175. See, e.g., Robert Dudley, Peter Taylor, Sophie Wickham & Paul Hutton, Psychosis,
Delusions, and the “Jumping to Conclusions” Reasoning Bias: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 42 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 652, 656–63 (2016); So et al., supra note 132, at 160
(performing meta-analysis and finding robust evidence for JTC in individuals with psychosis
compared to healthy individuals); Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 80 (“Systematic reviews
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contextual evidence.”176 Some evidence suggests that this bias results from a failure
to shift toward analytic reasoning when a conflict arises between intuitive and
analytic reasoning.177 A large body of research suggests this tendency to gather scant
data before reaching a conclusion may “lead to the premature acceptance of
implausible ideas” and thus contribute to persistence, and perhaps formation, of
delusional beliefs.178 Importantly, the presence of this bias is not associated with any
particular mental illness, but rather is elevated in delusional groups across various
diagnoses.179 The jumping-to-conclusions bias represents overuse of a System 1
process as it reflects reaching a conclusion without gathering and reflecting upon
sufficient evidence.180
Research “strongly suggests” that these reasoning biases play a causal role in the
genesis and maintenance of delusions.181 All of these biases are associated with
delusions across multiple diagnoses, not merely with having schizophrenia or a
psychiatric illness generally.182 Research also shows that each of the evidenceintegration biases correlates positively with delusional severity.183 Together, these
systematic distortions in thinking reflect decreased engagement in analytic reasoning
processes. They render populations with delusions more likely to make hasty
decisions consistent with existing delusional beliefs and less likely to revise their
initial interpretation of events in response to contrary evidence. In the context of
emotion-laden decisions—such as those involving anger or fear—these cognitive
biases may be particularly likely to result in inaccurate judgments.184

and meta-analyses demonstrate a large and consistent evidence base in over 50 studies, in
which the clear majority show that individuals with delusions and psychosis make decisions
on the basis of limited evidence in probabilistic reasoning tasks; the so-called ‘jump-toconclusions’ (JTC) data-gathering bias.”).
176. Estrella Serrano-Guerrero, Miguel Ruiz-Veguilla, Agustín Martín-Rodríguez & Juan
F. Rodríguez-Testal, Inflexibility of Beliefs and Jumping to Conclusions in Active
Schizophrenia, PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 1 (2020).
177. See W. J. Speechley, C.B. Murray, R.M. McKay, M.T. Munz & E.T.C. Ngan, A
Failure of Conflict to Modulate Dual-Stream Processing May Underlie the Formation and
Maintenance of Delusions, 25 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 80, 81, 84–85 (2010).
178. Dudley et al., supra note 175, at 652; see Savulich et al., supra note 128, at 520.
179. See McLean et al., supra note 134, at 351 (concluding that delusional status is a good
predictor of JTC bias, whereas a diagnosis of mental illness, e.g., schizophrenia, is not).
180. Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 82 (“It is apparent that JTC may reflect the
operation of [System] 1 fast processes . . . .”).
181. Bronstein et al., supra note 134, at 1; see McLean et al., supra note 134, at 352. It is
important to emphasize that psychosis is complex and multicausal, likely arising from a
number of interacting genetic, biological, psychological, and social factors. See, e.g., Jim van
Os & Uli Reininghaus, Psychosis as a Transdiagnostic and Extended Phenotype in the
General Population, 15 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 118, 120–21 (2016) (discussing various factors
that contribute to symptoms of psychosis).
182. McLean et al., supra note 134, at 352.
183. Id. at 350.
184. See Ward & Garety, supra note 146, at 82–83; KAHNEMAN, supra note 150, at 234–
44 (discussing the relative likelihood of inaccurate predictions when relying on intuition).
Kahneman suggests that the reliability of intuitions reflects two basic conditions—that is, an
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2. Emotional Dysfunction
Delusions are also associated with emotional dysfunctions that make engagement
in deliberate, analytic System 2 processing more difficult and less likely. Decades of
research demonstrate that emotion plays an important (and complex) role in reason185
and moral judgment.186 Researchers have theorized that emotion is pertinent in both
the automatic “social-emotional” pathway and the deliberate “cognitive” pathway
processes of Greene’s dual process model of moral reasoning187: emotions can be
generated intuitively; emotion regulation involves cognitive processes which can upor down-regulate emotions upon reflection; and emotion regulation can become
habitual.188 Numerous studies, using various research designs, suggest that negative
affect—“an umbrella term used for affective states and discrete emotions such as
fear, shame, guilt, and anger”—plays a significant role in the formation,
maintenance, and exacerbation of delusions,189 especially those involving
persecution.190 The key role of negative affect in persecutory delusion formation and
delusional interpretation suggests a link between psychosis and deficiencies in
emotion regulation.191

“environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable” and “an opportunity to learn these
regularities through prolonged practice.” KAHNEMAN, supra note 150, at 240.
185. A number of scholars have examined the importance of emotion for reasoning in the
context of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the
Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal
Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 313–27, 328–29, 341 (1998); Theodore Y. Blumoff,
Rationality, Insanity, and the Insanity Defense: Reflections on the Limits of Reason, 39 LAW
& PSYCH. REV. 161, 167–68, 187–93 (2014–2015); Coppola, supra note 25, at 6–7, 30–49;
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the Criminal
Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1399–1409 (2006).
186. See infra notes 188, 198–200; Yana R. Avramova & Yoel Inbar, Emotion and Moral
Judgment, 4 WIREs COGNITIVE SCI. 169, 170–75 (2013) (assessing the evidentiary basis for
three claims regarding the role of emotion in moral judgment).
187. See supra notes 155–159 (discussing Greene’s model).
188. See Chelsea Helion & Kevin N. Ochsner, The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral
Judgment, 11 NEUROETHICS 297, 299–300 (2018).
189. Lea Ludwig, Dirk Werner & Tania M. Lincoln, The Relevance of Cognitive Emotion
Regulation to Psychotic Symptoms – A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, CLINICAL
PSYCH. REV. 1, 1 (2019).
190. See Antonio Preti & Matteo Cella, Paranoid Thinking as a Heuristic, 4 EARLY
INTERVENTION PSYCHIATRY 263, 263 (2010). In fact, emotion may play a role in contributing
to formation of many discrete delusion subtypes. For example, clinical psychologists Daniel
Freeman and Philippa Garety observed that “all the major emotions have delusions with
related themes, which is consistent with a direct role for emotion in delusion formation.”
Daniel Freeman & Philippa A. Garety, Connecting Neurosis and Psychosis: The Direct
Influence of Emotion on Delusions and Hallucinations, 41 BEHAV. RSCH. & THERAPY 923, 933
(2003); see id. at 933 tbl.2 (providing common themes of emotions and corresponding delusion
subtypes).
191. See Anett Gyurak, James J. Gross & Amit Etkin, Explicit and Implicit Emotion
Regulation: A Dual-Process Framework, 25 COGNITION & EMOTION 400, 401 (2011) (defining
emotion regulation as “goal directed processes functioning to influence the intensity, duration,
and type of emotion experienced”) (emphasis in original). Considerable definitional ambiguity

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 335

1/24/22 9:05 AM

324

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:297

A 2019 systematic review and meta-analysis concluded that emotion regulation
is “markedly impaired in patients with psychotic disorders.”192 The meta-analysis
found that individuals with psychosis habitually use more maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies, such as rumination and suppression,193 and fewer adaptive
strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal,194 compared to healthy controls.195 Further,
correlative data indicated a positive association between maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies and positive symptoms of psychosis such as delusions.196 An
earlier review and meta-analysis found similar results concerning habitual use of
emotion-regulation strategies.197
The marked impairment of emotion regulation in populations with psychosis
holds important implications for moral reasoning. “Wrongfulness” is a moral
judgment, and moral dilemmas (which involve an evaluation of the moral
acceptability of one’s or another’s actions) induce negative emotions such as anger
or fear in decision-makers.198 Increasing evidence shows that regulating negative
emotions through cognitive reappraisal—a System 2 process—impacts moral
decision-making by leading to more reason-based judgments.199 Other studies have

attends the term “emotional regulation.” Ludwig et al., supra note 189, at 2 (discussing the
distinction between “emotion regulation” and “coping”).
192. Ludwig et al., supra note 189, at 1.
193. Rumination refers to “passive and repetitive focus on negative emotions or symptoms
of distress.” Clara Marie Nittel, Tania Marie Lincoln, Fabian Lamster, Dirk Leube, Winfried
Rief, Tilo Kircher & Stephanie Mehl, Expressive Suppression is Associated with State
Paranoia in Psychosis: An Experience Sampling Study on the Association Between Adaptive
and Maladaptive Emotion Regulation Strategies and Paranoia, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCH.
291, 295 tbl.1 (2018). Suppression refers to “conscious inhibition of expressive or behavioural
components of an emotion.” Id.
194. Cognitive reappraisal is defined as a “cognitive change that involves changing the
subjective interpretation of an emotion-eliciting event in a way that alters its emotional
impact.” Id. at 294.
195. Ludwig et al., supra note 189, at 6. “Adaptive” emotion regulation strategies are
associated with better mental health outcomes, while “maladaptive” strategies are associated
with poorer mental health outcomes. Nittel et al., supra note 193, at 293, 296. In particular,
the meta-analysis found that individuals with psychosis were significantly more likely to
habitually manage emotions through the maladaptive strategies of rumination, self-blaming,
distraction, and suppression. Ludwig et al., supra note 189, at 6, 8. The effect sizes for
rumination, self-blaming, and distraction were in the moderate to large range. Id. at 6.
196. Ludwig et al., supra note 189, at 7–8 (including self-blaming, suppression,
rumination, and maladaptive coping).
197. See Ciarán O’Driscoll, Jennifer Laing & Oliver Mason, Cognitive Emotion
Regulation Strategies, Alexithymia and Dissociation in Schizophrenia, a Review and MetaAnalysis, 34 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 482, 489–92 (2014).
198. Avramova & Inbar, supra note 186, at 172.
199. See Zhongquan Li, Shiyu Xia, Xiaoyuan Wu & Zhaoyu Chen, Analytical Thinking
Style Leads to More Utilitarian Moral Judgments: An Exploration with a ProcessDissociation Approach, 131 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 180, 183 (2018)
(comparing an “intuitive” and “analytical” group on moral dilemma tasks); Raluca D. Szekely
& Andrei C. Miu, Incidental Emotions in Moral Dilemmas: The Influence of Emotion
Regulation, 29 COGNITION & EMOTION 64, 71 (2015); Matthew Feinberg, Robb Willer, Olga
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found that individuals with relatively high emotion-regulation difficulties are more
likely to make intuitive, emotion-driven moral judgements.200 Since use of adaptive
emotion regulation in moral probes helps to overcome intuitively generated emotions
to reach a more deliberate judgment, it logically follows that populations with
psychosis tend to reach less-reasoned judgments in scenarios involving intense
negative emotion.
Stress makes intuitive decision-making particularly likely. Experimentally,
individuals with psychosis demonstrate a stronger reaction to stressors compared to
healthy controls.201 Stemming from the observation that individuals make more
intuitive responses when under stress, the “stress induced deliberation-to-intuition”
(SIDI) model theorizes how stress affects moral decision-making.202 The model
suggests that, under stressful conditions, “intuitive responses may bypass the
examination of reasoning and reach the threshold to become final decisions.”203
Research has found that stress induces fewer reasoned decisions on a moral decisionmaking task using moral dilemmas,204 although results are inconsistent with
everyday moral decision tasks.205 The majority of studies point to “convergent

Antonenko & Oliver P. John, Liberating Reason from the Passions: Overriding Intuitionist
Moral Judgments Through Emotional Reappraisal, 23 PSYCH. SCI. 788, 790–93 (2012).
200. See Lisong Zhang, Ming Kong & Zhongquan Li, Emotion Regulation Difficulties and
Moral Judgment in Different Domains: The Mediation of Emotional Valence and Arousal, 109
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 56, 58 (2017) (using a set of standardized immoral
scenarios and finding that emotion regulation difficulties positively predicted immorality
ratings in the five moral domains of Sanctity, Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, and Authority); Lisong
Zhang, Zhongquan Li, Xiaoyuan Wu & Ziyuan Zhang, Why People with More Emotion
Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological
Inclinations, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Nov. 2017, 1, at 5. Notably, however, although the
participants in these studies were classified as having emotion regulation difficulties, they did
not have psychiatric illnesses; additionally, the subjects were Chinese students so
generalizability to Western culture should be made with caution.
201. Tania M. Lincoln, Maike Hartmann, Ulf Köther & Steffen Moritz, Dealing with
Feeling: Specific Emotion Regulation Skills Predict Responses to Stress in Psychosis, 228
PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 216, 219–21 (2015) (using noise stressors to show that individuals with
psychotic illnesses—specifically schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder—demonstrated
more reactivity to stress both through self-report (i.e., subjective) and physiological (i.e.,
objective) measures).
202. See Rongjun Yu, Stress Potentiates Decision Biases: A Stress Induced Deliberationto-Intuition (SIDI) Model, 3 NEUROBIOLOGY STRESS 83, 83 (2016).
203. Id. at 84 (“[S]tressed individuals may fall back on more intuition and involve less
amounts of conscious reasoning.”).
204. See Farid F. Youssef et al., Stress Alters Personal Moral Decision Making, 37
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 491, 494–95 (2012) (demonstrating a moderate negative
correlation between stress and utilitarian decisions during personal moral dilemma tasks and
noting that the results are in line with Greene’s dual-process model).
205. While everyday moral decision tasks may be ecologically valid, they are less
emotionally evocative than moral dilemma tasks and therefore are less effective at highlighting
competing deontological and utilitarian processes. Compare Katrin Starcke, Christin Polzer,
Oliver T. Wolf & Matthias Brand, Does Stress Alter Everyday Moral Decision-Making?, 36
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 210, 214–16 (2011) (finding no difference between groups on
everyday moral decision-making tasks, although there was an association between increased
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evidence that stressed individuals are . . . less likely to exert cognitive control to
examine their responses [to moral dilemmas].”206 Importantly, the SIDI model does
not necessarily indicate that stress is detrimental to decision-making, as some
situations (i.e., where fight-or-flight response is appropriate) call for an intuitive
response without the need for cognitive control.207 However, in an individual with
persecutory delusions, where stress has been inappropriately generated and
maintained, the likelihood of a contextually inappropriate response intuitively driven
by stress is high.
In sum, a host of cognitive biases and emotional impairments combine to
implicate an overreliance on System 1 intuitive processing and failed engagement of
System 2 analytical processing. This tendency may be particularly pronounced in
situations related to delusional beliefs. Stress exacerbates the tendency to reach
intuitive decisions that bypass analytic scrutiny. Forensic psychiatrists should
consider these disordered patterns of reasoning and emotion regulation, along with
other forms of cognitive and emotional impairment, when assessing a defendant’s
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of her criminal act.
3. Implications for Sanity Evaluations
Research suggests that deluded individuals may have a diminished tendency to
accurately evaluate external events, generate options for actions, engage in reflective
decision-making, and reach reasoned decisions, especially when under stress and
confronted by evidence that challenges preexisting beliefs. Each of these forms of
disorder may be relevant to an individual’s capacity to reflect upon and appreciate
the wrongfulness of her acts and should be considered in sanity evaluation along with
other evidence of impairment.
The potential effect of these impairments can be illustrated through the
hypothetical in the introduction. Recall that Rowl believed his parents were engaged
in a homicidal plot and on the day of the killing discovered his missing gun. Rowl
exhibited the jumping-to-conclusions bias by relying on inadequate information to
conclude that his father had taken the gun to leave him defenseless against those
planning to kill him. Liberal acceptance also helps to explain Rowl’s
misinterpretation: Rowl’s belief in the murderous plot lowered his subjective
threshold of significance for evidence in support of this belief. Thus, although a
missing gun was weak evidence of his father’s murderous intent, it still exceeded
Rowl’s subjective threshold of significance, leading to his delusional conclusion.

cortisol response and egoistic responses to high-emotional dilemmas, thus concluding that
“stress overall does not impair everyday moral decision-making in the current setting, but
endocrine stress responses might be related to egoistic decision-making”), with Nina Singer,
Monika Sommer, Katrin Döhnel, Sandra Zänkert, Stefan Wüst & Brigitte M. Kudielka, Acute
Psychosocial Stress and Everyday Moral Decision-Making in Young Healthy Men: The Impact
of Cortisol, 93 HORMONES & BEHAV. 72, 75–78 (2017) (observing that stress led to more
altruistic decisions on everyday moral decision-making tasks and suggesting that the
contrasting results are due to less emotionally evocative dilemmas used in the instant study
compared to Starcke et al., supra).
206. Yu, supra note 202, at 91.
207. Id. at 92.
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Additional facts are necessary to illustrate how evidence-integration dysfunction
could contribute to Rowl’s erroneous conclusions. Imagine that Rowl, upon
discovering the missing gun, remembered that his father had lent his own gun to a
friend and had an upcoming hunting trip. Imagine Rowl also noticed his hunting cap,
which he shared with his father, was absent from the closet. A reasonable person in
this situation may conclude his father borrowed his gun to hunt. However, because
of his psychosis, Rowl exhibited belief inflexibility by failing to integrate evidence
of his father’s need for a gun to modify his conclusion that his father wanted to leave
him vulnerable to attempted murder. He manifested bias against disconfirmatory
evidence when he failed to revise his initial interpretation of the missing gun in light
of contrary evidence. He also demonstrated bias against confirmatory evidence by
not acknowledging the increasing plausibility of the hunting explanation when he
noted the missing hunting cap. The effect of these cognitive biases in solidifying
Rowl’s conclusion that his father was advancing the murderous plot could have been
exaggerated by Rowl’s difficulty in regulating his rage and fear—especially in the
stress of the moment—leading to an emotion-fueled, intuitive decision with little
deliberative reflection.
Recognizing the biases and impairments that contribute to the origin,
maintenance, and strengthening of delusions could assist forensic experts when
interpreting a defendant’s behavior and explaining their conclusions to the trier of
fact. A forensic expert’s evaluation focuses on a defendant’s thinking and behavior
at the time of the offense.208 As James Ogloff and colleagues explain, “The clinical
evaluation of a defendant’s mental state at the time of offense is, fundamentally, an
investigative endeavor that attempts to retrospectively reconstruct the cognitive,
conative, emotional, motivational, and psychopathological concomitants and
determinants of the defendant’s behavior at the time of the crime.”209 This
retrospective inquiry “always requires some degree of speculation” and thus requires
“placing the data in a psychological conceptual framework that is relevant to the legal
issues.”210 Of course, knowledge of reasoning impairments associated with delusions
does not provide direct evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the moment of the
criminal act, but it may suggest probabilistically how psychopathological elements
could have affected the defendant’s mental functioning.211 Such knowledge could
also be used to buttress the expert’s conclusions when explaining the relationship

208. Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S23.
209. James R.P. Ogloff, Caton F. Roberts & Ronald Roesch, The Insanity Defense: Legal
Standards and Clinical Assessment, 2 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCH. 163, 169 (1993).
210. Id. at 168.
211. Id. at 172; MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.07, at 251 (observing that a psychiatric
diagnosis “may facilitate consideration of the extent to which biological, personality, and/or
situational factors influenced legally relevant behavior”); id. at 250 (“With appropriate
caution, examiners may even elaborate on behaviors often associated with the syndrome or
diagnosis—for example, type and degree of cognitive impairment, perceptual disturbances,
range and control of emotional expression, and so on . . . .”).
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between a defendant’s mental disorder, her irrationality, and (if permitted to opine
on the subject) the legal criteria of insanity to the jury.212
However, some forensic mental health professionals largely confine their
consideration of delusions to their disordered content, so recognition of the cognitive
and emotional processes implicated by delusions would require updating and
expanding their evaluative focus in sanity evaluations.213 Brandon A. Yakush
(forensic psychologist) and Melinda Wolbransky (professor of psychology) suggest
that forensic mental health examiners, when assessing “whether or not the
defendant’s mental disorder or defect impaired his capacity to reason through the
illegality of the act,”214 largely focus on evidence of thought disorder—or evidence
of a disturbance in the organization, processing, and interconnectivity of ideas—and
ignore the potential contribution of delusions.215 Yakush and Wolbransky justify this
position with their belief that delusions do not involve cognitive dysfunctions
sufficiently corrosive of appreciation to warrant consideration in the general rightor-wrong test.216 They explain:
If the belief that drives the illicit behavior is sourced in mental illness
(e.g., delusional ideation) . . . from a clinical perspective, the defendant
likely knew the act was illegal in so far as much as he was capable of
processing right- and wrong-level cognitions. Due to an absence of
mental disorganization, the reasoning skills necessary to reason right and
wrong were typically present. Yet, the processing of right and wrong was
likely contaminated by delusional content. Thus, the defendant was able
to think about right and wrong decisions but came to the wrong
conclusion due to false beliefs.217

212. Whether the rules of evidence permit a forensic expert to opine on whether the
defendant satisfies the legal standard for insanity varies by jurisdiction. See Comment Note:
Testimony of Expert Witness as to Ultimate Fact, 78 A.L.R. 755 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
213. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 61 (“The criminal law does not recognize a
transcendent constancy in the legal insanity status of psychotic individuals whose offense was
the result of their delusional ideation. In most such cases, exculpation is based primarily on
the specific content of their delusions and how it comports with the law of the jurisdiction in
which the act was committed.”); infra notes 214–219.
214. Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 26, at 360. The authors stated, “While this article
focuses primarily on the issue of defining wrongfulness in California, the discussion is relevant
for those other states and the federal courts that have adopted similar definitions of insanity.”
Id. at 357.
215. Id. at 366 (“Thus, the clinical component of insanity evaluations in California should
focus primarily on the role of cognitive dysfunctions that could have impaired the defendant’s
ability to process right versus wrong decisions. Any other symptoms would be important only
to the final decision if they somehow impaired the defendant’s reasoning abilities (e.g., the
auditory hallucinations were so constant and overwhelming that the individual was unable to
think clearly).”).
216. Id. at 360. This statement is true so long as a defendant maintained the capacity to
know that society would view the act as wrong. See id. at 366.
217. Id. at 360.
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Thus, the typical delusional defendant will be found sane.218 Yakush and Wolbransky
identify one exception: delusions that involve perceived justification, such as acting
in self-defense because of imminent danger, may qualify for insanity without
additional signs of cognitive dysfunction.219 This position is consistent with an oftneglected rule in M’Naghten’s Case called the “insane delusion rule,” which is
explored in the next Section.220
This perspective stands in tension with the growing scientific consensus that
delusions are strongly associated with reasoning biases reflecting a diminished
engagement with analytical decision-making. Key components of sanity depend on
ability to reason. While cognitive biases alone may not impact the accuracy of
judgments,221 research suggests they can lead to errors when combined with emotionregulation difficulties and evidence-integration dysfunction, particularly in emotionladen situations.222 Thus, forensic mental health examiners should consider the
systemic, cognitive, and affective distortions associated with delusions, in addition
to delusions’ faulty content, in sanity evaluations and assess the extent they could
have undermined a defendant’s ability to understand the wrongfulness of her act.
B. Ignorance of Wrongfulness
Rather than focusing on ability, a more common way of resolving sanity inquiries
involves demonstrating the defendant’s actual knowledge that her act was wrong.223
In eleven jurisdictions, this inquiry is dictated by the insanity test, which expressly
limits moral incapacity to a defendant’s ignorance of wrongfulness due to mental
disease or defect.224 The explicit focus of this inquiry differs from that in tests with
a lack-of-capacity component: instead of focusing on the disability (the incapacity to
know or appreciate wrongfulness), the inquiry centers on the excusing condition.225

218. See id. at 366 (“In essence, delusions or hallucinations in the absence of cognitive
impairments would not ordinarily lead to the type of dysfunction necessary for the defendant
to have not known his act was wrong, whether illegal or immoral.”).
219. Id. at 366–67. In addition, individuals experiencing delusions that are “so bizarre that
[they] fall[] outside of society’s moral framework,” such as the belief that the victim is a
menacing alien, may qualify for insanity. Id. at 367.
220. See infra Part II.B.1.
221. R.E.J. Dudley & D.E. Over, People with Delusions Jump to Conclusions: A
Theoretical Account of Research Findings on the Reasoning of People with Delusions, 10
CLINICAL PSYCH. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 263, 269 (2003).
222. See id. at 264, 272; supra Part II.A.2 (surveying emotional dysfunctions associated
with delusions).
223. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (observing that, when applying incapacity
standards, courts concentrate on the actual state of knowledge of the defendant).
224. These states include Arizona, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. See Appendix.
225. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, Insanity, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 173 (July 2020 update) (“The
issues . . . are distinct: the degree of impairment of capacity to know is a disability issue;
whether the actor actually knew his particular conduct was wrong is an excusing condition
issue. In requiring that the actor not know his conduct is wrong, M’Naghten did not require a
complete impairment of capacity to distinguish right and wrong. While there may be good
reason to require a substantial impairment in order to satisfy the disability requirement[,] . . .
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Because ascertaining the defendant’s knowledge of wrongfulness is a common aim
of sanity evaluations, however, this section is widely relevant.226
1. Insane Delusion Rule
The tendency of some forensic psychiatrists to limit delusions’ relevance to their
content coheres with some jurisdictions’ treatment of delusions under the “insane
delusion rule,” an enigmatic, subsidiary rule in M’Naghten’s Case.227 This rule holds
that when the defendant labored under a “partial delusion only”—meaning that her
only symptom of mental illness was her delusional belief on a particular subject228—
her culpability must be assessed as if the factual content of her delusion were true.229
Thus, if a person with delusions killed in self-defense, as she believed, she should be
acquitted.230 But if she killed anticipating future harm, she may be convicted of
intentional murder.231 The rule has been employed both in jurisdictions with
ignorance-of-wrongfulness tests and in those with lack-of-capacity tests, presumably
under the logic that a delusional person who believed she was acting in justified selfdefense necessarily was unable to realize her act was wrong.232 Importantly, modern
cases typically ignore the “partial delusion” language and apply the rule in cases
where other aspects of mental disorder are clearly evident, as with schizophrenia.233

there is no reason to believe that whenever a dysfunction is sufficient to cause a loss of
‘substantial capacity to appreciate’ that it necessarily will in fact cause a sufficient lack of
appreciation to satisfy the excusing condition.”).
226. See infra note 232 (discussing application of insane delusion rule to incapacity
standards).
227. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211 (1843). For an
investigation into contemporary manifestations of this rule and their soundness, see Johnston
& Leahey, supra note 2, at 1794–1819.
228. Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1794.
229. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211 (“[Assuming] that he labours under . . . partial
delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same
situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were
real.”).
230. Id.
231. See Ryan v. People, 153 P. 756, 758 (Colo. 1915).
232. The insane delusion rule—in carefully and repeatedly cabining its application to a
defendant with a “partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane”—limits itself to
ignorance of knowledge and expressly does not extend to incapacity to appreciate
wrongfulness. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211. However, most of the jurisdictions
that employ the insane delusion rule only reference incapacity in their insanity standards. See
infra note 237; Appendix (noting statutes for California, Georgia, Nevada, Tennessee, and the
federal and military systems of justice). Moreover, although the insane delusion rule was used
to interpret ignorance of knowledge, states have applied its principle to insanity standards with
“appreciation” in place of knowledge. See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84–85 (Nev. 2001)
(using the insane delusion rule to exemplify and define the limits of a defendant’s inability to
“appreciate the wrongfulness of his act”).
233. See, e.g., Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84–85 (Nev. 2001); Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d
1249, 1271–74 (10th Cir. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2018). On the other hand,
Tennessee appears to limit the rule to defendants with intact reasoning capabilities. See
Overton v. State, 56 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tenn. 1933).
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Consistent with Yakush and Wolbransky’s position234—and mirrored in some
forensic practice guides235—the insane delusion rule directs courts and forensic
evaluators to scrutinize the content of a defendant’s delusions and strictly assess
whether acting under the perceived circumstances would satisfy the elements of a
recognized justification or excuse.236 Appellate decisions document that nine
jurisdictions employ the affirmative aspect of the rule, meaning they allow a
delusion’s perceived satisfaction of a legal defense (when that delusion stemmed
from a mental disease or defect and motivated the criminal act) to establish a
defendant’s insanity without further inquiry.237 A couple of jurisdictions recognize a
negative aspect as well, holding that a delusion’s failure to conform to a legal
justification or excuse may be fatal to her insanity claim.238 In California, for
instance, when a delusion (if true) would not justify or excuse, a defendant’s moral
incapacity may depend on additional evidence of thought disorder and global
cognitive dysfunction, such as deficits in attention, working memory, and executive
functioning.239 Nevada precludes a finding of moral incapacity altogether for a
person whose delusions would not justify the criminal act.240

234. See supra notes 214–219.
235. See supra note 213; Rogers, supra note 4, at 109 (“The crux of the determination can
be stated simply: If the defendant’s beliefs and perceptions were accurate, would they justify
his or her actions?”). For an interesting and effective illustration of a forensic expert’s
application of the insane delusion rule, see Kate Bloch & Jeffery Gould, Legal Indeterminacy
in Insanity Cases: Clarifying Wrongfulness and Applying a Triadic Approach to Forensic
Evaluations, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 927–28 (2016).
236. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 940 S.W.2d 810, 813–14 (Tex. App. 1997) (describing
proper and improper jury instructions in insane delusion cases); CAL. JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 4.06
(7th ed. 2016) (“A defendant who commits an act that would otherwise be criminal is not
guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant was suffering from an insane delusion, and the
facts perceived as real as a product of the delusion would have caused the act to be lawful.”);
GA. SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 3.80.30 (4th ed. 2019) (“In order for mental
delusion or delusional compulsion to constitute a defense, it must appear not only that the
accused was actually laboring under a delusion at the time of the commission of the alleged
criminal act but that the alleged criminal act itself was connected with the particular delusion
under which the accused was then laboring and that the delusion was as to a fact that, if true,
would have justified the alleged act by the accused.”).
237. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2018); United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612–
13 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319, 324–26 (C.A.A.F. 2013); People v.
Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 912 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 27,
2015); Martin v. State, 110 So. 3d 936, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d
66, 84–85 (Nev. 2001); Dukes v. State, 499 P.2d 471, 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Davis v.
State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 994 (Tenn. 1930); Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 812.
238. See Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912; Finger, 27 P.3d at 84–85.
239. See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at Part II.B.3 (considering California’s use of
the rule); see supra notes 136–137 (describing forms of cognitive impairment often associated
with schizophrenia).
240. Finger, 27 P.3d at 85 (limiting insanity to delusional defendants whose delusions, “if
true, would justify the commission of the criminal act”). Nevada apparently does not recognize
other forms of moral incapacity. Id. at 85 (“Unless a defendant presents evidence that complies
with this standard, he or she is not entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue of insanity.”).
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Many scholars, including this author, have criticized the reasoning behind—and
the application of—the insane delusion rule.241 This Article will not repeat those
critiques but offers two new arguments as to why and how courts should interpret
this rule differently in light of modern science. First, the logic of the insane delusion
rule suggests it should factor in all mental-disorder-related impairments of the
defendant, not simply the content of her delusions. Second, scientific insights suggest
that delusional defendants should be held to a more relaxed standard of wrongfulness
than strict illegality. In essence, a jury should be permitted to excuse a deluded
individual if, had her delusion been real, her action would have satisfied the basic
thrust (not necessarily the particulars) of a legal defense, especially if the individual
is able to explain why she thought the act was “necessary” at the time she did it.242
This would be akin to adopting a societal morality standard.243 Evidence suggests
that such treatment would be more consistent with the origins of M’Naghten and
would cohere with community notions of insanity and justice.244 While the cognitive
and emotional impairments detailed in Part II.A lend support to these positions, these
arguments can be made most forcefully by examining the science of persecutory
delusions.
2. The Special Case of Persecutory Delusions
Persecutory delusions—defined as beliefs that others intend current or future
harm to oneself245—are the most common type of delusion.246 Persecutory delusions
are associated with violence247 and appear to be of particular significance in insanity
cases.248 As Richard Rogers, a distinguished professor of psychology, reports, “[t]he
most common reason why a defendant does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his

241. See, e.g., Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2; STEPHEN, supra note 33, at 156–64; S.
SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 169–71, 183, 249–53 (1925)
(noting that at least eight states follow the rule); I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY §§ 34–35 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1860).
242. See infra notes 320 & 328 (comparing this proposal to Christopher Slobogin’s
Integrationist Test).
243. See infra notes 347–348 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 378–382.
245. See Daniel Freeman & Philippa A. Garety, Comments on the Content of Persecutory
Delusions: Does the Definition Need Clarification?, 39 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 407, 409,
412 (2000) (identifying commonalities and differences among common definitions of
“persecutory delusions” and suggesting new criteria).
246. Speechley & Ngan, supra note 160, at 1211; Preti & Cella, supra note 190, at 263.
247. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Coid, Simone Ullrich, Constantinos Kallis, Robert Keers, Dave
Barker, Fiona Cowden & Rebekah Stamps, The Relationship Between Delusions and
Violence: Findings from the East London First Episode Psychosis Study, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY
465, 467–70 (2013) (finding a significant association between serious violence and delusions
of surveillance, persecution, and conspiracy); infra notes 296–308 (discussing the relationship
between persecutory delusions, anger, and violence).
248. See, e.g., George F. Parker, Outcomes of Assertive Community Treatment in an NGRI
Conditional Release Program, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 291, 295 tbl.1 (2004)
(examining eighty-three NGRI acquittees and finding that fifty-nine (71%) had a diagnosis of
schizophrenia and fifty-four (65%) had paranoid schizophrenia specifically).
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or her actions is because of grossly misperceived threats.”249 Research indicates that
a number of perceptual and inferential cognitive processes related to information
processing contribute to paranoid thinking.250 Of particular importance, attentional
biases, attributional biases, and reasoning biases associated with persecutory
delusions all affect a delusional person’s subjective appraisal of perceived threats.251
These threats can generate anger, which may impel aggression when not effectively
regulated.252
a. Threat Appraisal
A sustained body of studies documents that populations with persecutory
delusions are more likely to perceive threats from ambiguous or neutral
circumstances and to infer hostile intent than those without such delusions.253
Researchers hypothesize that attentional, attributional, and reasoning biases drive
these appraisals.
First, investigations of cognitive biases in populations with persecutory delusions
have found an attentional bias in relation to threat-related information,254 resulting in
hypervigilance and excessive sensitivity to possible danger.255 Although consensus

249. Rogers, supra note 4, at 109.
250. See Dennis R. Combs, David L. Penn, Christopher O. Michael, Michael R. Basso,
Rachel Wiedeman, Marsha Siebenmorgan, Joshua Tiegreen & Dustin Chapman, Perceptions
of Hostility by Persons with and Without Persecutory Delusions, 14 COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 30, 31 (2009) (observing that “[i]ncreased attention to threatening stimuli,
jumping to conclusions, a failure to generate alternatives, theory of mind deficits, problems in
emotion perception, and the presence of differences in attributional style have all been
associated with persecutory delusions” and listing relevant reviews of these areas). The
discussion in this Section—which involves how individuals with persecutory delusions tend
to reason under stress and when experiencing anger—is conceptually better treated as a lack
of capacity issue and may be useful for that purpose. However, to the extent that forensic
examiners tend to limit conception of incapacity to formal thought disorder, the impairments
discussed in this section (especially when appearing in a person not evidencing other
manifestations of cognitive dysfunction) may be more fruitfully applied within the ignorance
of knowledge category of insanity.
251. “‘Threat appraisal’ . . . refers to classifying a stimulus based on its capacity for
harming the organism.” Raphael Underwood, Veena Kumari & Emmanuelle Peters, Cognitive
and Neural Models of Threat Appraisal in Psychosis: A Theoretical Integration, 239
PSYCHIATRY RES. 131, 133 (2016).
252. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
253. R.P. Bentall, R. Corcoran, R. Howard, N. Blackwood & P. Kinderman, Persecutory
Delusions: A Review and Theoretical Integration, 21 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 1143, 1154–55
(2001).
254. See Antonella Trotta, Jungwoo Kang, Daniel Stahl & Jenny Yiend, Interpretation
Bias in Paranoia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, CLINICAL PSYCH. SCI. 3, 4 (2021)
(“Attentional bias is thought of as the preferential selection, for further processing, of one
stimulus from among multiple competing stimuli. A bias occurs when the selected stimulus is
consistently of one particular type, such as threat in the case of anxiety or paranoid in the case
of paranoia.”).
255. Underwood et al., supra note 251, at 134.
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has not yet been reached on the precise profile of the bias,256 accumulated evidence
supports a two-stage “vigilance-avoidance” model, whereby populations with
persecutory delusions exhibit “an initial automatic attentional bias towards
threatening material, but a subsequent controlled attentional bias away from
threat.”257 Researchers theorize that the first automatic attentional bias may
contribute to misperceiving threat in ambiguous situations, while the second
controlled bias may prevent corrective re-evaluation of information.258 This theory
substantially overlaps with the dual-process model, where misperception of threat
mirrors the jumping-to-conclusions bias and overuse of System 1, and the
disinclination to re-evaluate information reflects a bias against disconfirmatory
evidence and impaired engagement of System 2.259
Each of the biases in the vigilance-avoidance model finds support from empirical
data. Consistent with an excessive initial sensitivity to and tendency to dwell on
threatening stimuli,260 memory studies have found that patients with persecutory
delusions show better memory for threat-related words than those without delusions
and a significant tendency to repeat these words during recall.261 Patients with
persecutory delusions also estimate that negative events happen more often to
themselves and others, “indicating a paranoid world view in which everyone is seen
as vulnerable to threat.”262 A large collection of eye movement studies supports the

256. Savulich et al., supra note 128, at 517–19 (analyzing evidence in psychosis research
supporting selective attention to negative information, delay in attentional disengagement
from a threatening stimulus, and the vigilance-avoidance strategy).
257. Melissa J. Green & Mary L. Phillips, Social Threat Perception and the Evolution of
Paranoia, 28 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIOR REV. 333, 339 (2004); see K. Prochwicz & J.
Klosowska, Attentional Focus Moderates the Relationship Between Attention to Threat Bias
and Delusion-like Experiences in Healthy Adults, 39 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 27, 31 (2017).
258. Green & Phillips, supra note 257, at 339; Savulich et al., supra note 128, at 519.
259. See supra notes 167–80 and accompanying text (discussing evidence integration
impairment and jumping-to-conclusions bias).
260. Support for a heightened pre-attentive process of threatening information comes from
investigations of pre-attentive processing of words referring to delusional themes, which found
that patients with persecutory delusions were slower in naming the ink-color of threat-related
words, suggesting selective attention to those words. See Richard P. Bentall & Sue Kaney,
Content Specific Information Processing and Persecutory Delusions: An Investigation Using
the Emotional Stroop Test, 62 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 355, 355–64 (1989); Nathalie Besnier,
Arthur Kaladjian, Pascale Mazzola-Pomietto, Marc Adida, Eric Fakra, Régine Jeanningros &
Jean-Michel Azorin, Differential Responses to Emotional Interference in Paranoid
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Mania, 44 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1, 7–8 (2011) (finding an emotional
bias towards threatening words related to paranoia in group with schizophrenia and that
paranoid interference increased with positive symptoms).
261. See Richard P. Bentall, Sue Kaney & Kim Bowen-Jones, Persecutory Delusions and
Recall of Threat-Related, Depression-Related, and Neutral Words, 19 COGNITIVE THERAPY &
RSCH. 445, 453 (1995); Sue Kaney, Melanie Wolfenden, Michael E. Dewey & Richard P.
Bentall, Persecutory Delusions and Recall of Threatening Propositions, 31 BRIT. J. CLINICAL
PSYCH. 85, 85–87 (1992).
262. See Bentall et al., supra note 253, at 1154 (discussing Sue Kaney, Kim Bowen-Jones,
Michael E. Dewey & Richard P. Bentall, Two Predictions about Paranoid Ideation: Deluded,
Depressed and Normal Participants’ Subjective Frequency and Consensus Judgments for
Positive, Neutral and Negative Events, 36 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 349, 349–64 (1997)).
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existence of the second stage of attentional bias by showing that delusion-prone
populations pay less attention than healthy controls to the salient features of threatrelated facial expressions of anger and fear and to the threatening areas of social
scenes.263 These results may suggest hasty decision-making and reduced datagathering,264 in addition to hyper-vigilance.265 Interestingly, evidence suggests that,
while populations with persecutory delusions tend to misidentify neutral faces as
angry, 266 these populations are accurate (and particularly sensitive) in gauging
others’ expressions of negative emotions.267
Second, studies show that populations with persecutory delusions demonstrate a
hostile intent attribution bias.268 Hostile intent attribution bias refers generally to
responding in a hostile manner to ambiguous cues269 and is associated with resulting
anger.270 Research has consistently demonstrated that populations with persecutory

263. See Tobias E. Hillmann, Jürgen Kempkensteffen & Tania M. Lincoln, Visual
Attention to Threat-Related Faces and Delusion-Proneness: An Eye Tracking Study Using
Dynamic Stimuli, 39 COGNITIVE THERAPY RSCH. 808, 808–09 (2015) (reviewing visual scanpath studies of facial expressions); see also Green & Phillips, supra note 257, at 335–37
(reviewing visual scan-path studies of facial expressions and photographs of social scenes).
264. See Hillmann et al., supra note 263, at 813.
265. Underwood et al., supra note 251, at 134.
266. Amy E. Pinkham, Colleen Brensinger, Christian Kohler, Raquel E. Gur & Ruben C.
Gur, Actively Paranoid Patients with Schizophrenia Over Attribute Anger to Neutral Faces,
125 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 174, 174 (2011).
267. See Green & Phillips, supra note 257, at 334 (reporting “robust evidence for superior
emotion perception in paranoid schizophrenia patients . . . specifically with regard to negative
emotions” and suggesting “heightened perception of certain negative emotions may be
relevant to the genesis of persecutory delusions”); Penelope J. Davis & Melissa G. Gibson,
Recognition of Posed and Genuine Facial Expressions of Emotion in Paranoid and
Nonparanoid Schizophrenia, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 445, 448–49 (2000) (finding
individuals with paranoid schizophrenia displayed greater accuracy in recognizing genuine
facial expression of negative emotions and surprise than individuals with nonparanoid
schizophrenia and the control group).
268. See Erin B. Tone & Jennifer S. Davis, Paranoid Thinking, Suspicion, and Risk for
Aggression: A Neurodevelopmental Perspective, 24 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1031, 1039
(2012); Combs et al., supra note 250, at 45–46 (finding the group with persecutory delusions,
but not the psychiatric or nonpsychiatric control groups, showed a bias for perceiving hostility
in ambiguous situations); Suk Kyoon An, Jee In Kang, Jin Young Park, Kyung Ran Kim, Su
Young Lee & Eun Lee, Attribution Bias in Ultra-High Risk for Psychosis and First-Episode
Schizophrenia, 118 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 54, 54 (2010) (finding an attribution bias for
perceiving hostility and blaming others in first-episode patients with schizophrenia, which was
associated with persecutory symptoms, as well as participants at ultra-high risk for psychosis).
269. Thomas Suslow et al., Automatic Amygdala Response to Facial Expression in
Schizophrenia: Initial Hyperresponsitivity Followed by Hyporesponsitivity, 14 BMC
NEUROSCIENCE, 2013, at 4 (using neuroimaging to show that schizophrenia patients initially
showed greater amygdala activation to neutral face expressions compared to healthy controls,
although this was followed by subsequent amygdala hypoactivity in the patient group; the
authors interpreted the latter finding as possibly protecting the patient from environmental
overstimulation).
270. See Raymond W. Novaco, Cognitive-Behavioral Factors and Anger in the
Occurrence of Aggression and Violence, in THE WILEY HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE &
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delusions tend to blame others rather than situations for negative outcomes.271
Experimentally, patients with psychosis have shown difficulties processing negative
information,272 which researchers have suggested causes misinterpretation of what
others intend to communicate.273 A hostile attributional bias may contribute to an
individual with persecutory delusions perceiving a threat where none is actually
present.274 For instance, studies have found that populations with persecutory
delusions over-attribute anger to neutral faces,275 tend to misinterpret fearful faces as
angry and threatening,276 and are more prone to attribute hostility and aggression to
ambiguous social situations.277 Importantly, a recent study found that patients with
persecutory delusions exhibited a heightened perception of harm in relation to neutral
events as compared to individuals with high anxiety and healthy controls.278
Third, researchers speculate that myriad reasoning biases reinforce paranoid
beliefs and contribute to the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions.279

AGGRESSION, 329, 333 (Peter Sturmey ed., 2017).
271. See Paul Kinderman & Richard P. Bentall, Causal Attributions in Paranoia and
Depression: Internal, Personal, and Situational Attributions for Negative Events, 106 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCH. 341, 344 (1997) (demonstrating empirically that patients with paranoia
tended to make external, personal attributions for negative events when nonpatients tended to
choose situational or circumstantial external attributions).
272. Fumiaki Ito, Kazunori Matsumoto, Tesuo Miyakoshi, Noriyuki Ohmuro, Tomohiro
Uchida & Hiroo Matsuoka, Emotional Processing During Speech Communication and
Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 67 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 526, 528–
30 (2013) (finding a prominent correlation between positive symptoms and inappropriate
responses when processing affectively negative information); Norichika Iwashiro, Yosuke
Takano, Tatsunobu Natsubori, Yuta Aoki, Noriaki Yahata, Wataru Gonoi, Akira Kunimatsu,
Osamu Abe, Kiyoto Kasai & Hidenori Yamasue, Aberrant Attentive and Inattentive Brain
Activity to Auditory Negative Words, and Its Relation to Persecutory Delusion in Patients with
Schizophrenia, 15 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 491, 497–98 (2019) (finding
decreased brain activity in response to negatively valenced words in schizophrenia patients,
which correlated with positive symptoms and delusional behavior).
273. Ito et al., supra note 272, at 529.
274. Tone & Davis, supra note 268, at 1036 (listing studies suggesting that adults with
clinically significant persecutory delusions and normal-range paranoid ideation show a bias to
overattend to various kinds of threat cues, “even in the absence of real danger,” but noting that
other research has failed to detect such biases in these populations).
275. Pinkham et al., supra note 266, at 177.
276. Ivy F. Tso, Anita M. Calwas, Jinsoo Chun, Savanna A. Mueller, Stephan F. Taylor &
Patricia J. Deldin, Altered Attentional and Perceptual Processes as Indexed by N170 During
Gaze Perception in Schizophrenia: Relationship with Perceived Threat and Paranoid
Delusions, 124 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 519, 519 (2015).
277. Combs et al., supra note 250, at 31 (finding the group with persecutory delusions, but
not the psychiatric or nonpsychiatric control groups, showed a bias for perceiving hostility in
ambiguous situations).
278. Suzanne Ho-wai So, Xiaoqi Sun, Gloria Hoi Kei Chan, Iris Hiu Hung Chan, Chui De
Chiu, Sherry Kit Wa Chan, Wai Yin Elisabeth Wong, Patrick Wing-leung Leung & Eric Yu
Hai Chen, Risk Perception in Paranoia and Anxiety: Two Investigations Across Clinical and
Non-Clinical Populations, 21 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 1, 5–6 (2020).
279. Prochwicz & Klosowska, supra note 257, at 28 (“Delusional ideation may develop
since attentional bias along with data gathering bias of JTC favour the development of false
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Early research stressed the key role of the jumping-to-conclusions bias to
maladaptive appraisals.280 This data-collection bias, perhaps cultivated by a
perceived need for closure and discomfort with ambiguity,281 could contribute to a
tendency to rapidly appraise ambiguous information on the basis of limited evidence
without a thorough consideration of alternatives.282 In addition, individuals under
stress may use the heuristic283 of paranoia to “increase the chances of perceiving
threatening stimuli or prevent the chance of missing a real menace, eventually
creating the preconditions for the development of delusional ideation.”284
In support, consider the observation that populations with psychosis often
demonstrate safety-seeking behaviors285 in response to situations perceived as
threatening.286 Safety-seeking behaviors are associated with increased levels of
anxiety and depression, suggesting the behaviors are at least partially related to fear
and distress.287 When faced with an ambiguous situation, an individual with
persecutory delusions may jump to the conclusion that there is a risk of harm and
engage in safety-seeking, and, since the individual has a diminished capacity to
reflect on behaviors associated with the delusion, she may incorrectly conclude that
the harm was avoided because of the safety-seeking, thus reinforcing the delusional

interpretations of neutral events, which are then maintained and fixed by other biases, such as
confirmation bias, belief inflexibility and external attribution bias.”).
280. Helen Startup, Daniel Freeman & Philippa A. Garety, Jumping to Conclusions and
Persecutory Delusions, 23 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 457–59 (2008) (finding evidence of jumping to
conclusions in a psychiatric group characterized by persecutory delusions); Underwood et al.,
supra note 251, at 133; Tone & Davis, supra note 268, at 1038 (collecting studies finding a
significant association between JTC bias and vulnerability to paranoid thoughts).
281. See Ryan McKay, Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart, Jumping to Delusions?
Paranoia, Probabilistic Reasoning, and Need for Closure, 12 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY
362, 362 (2007) (finding that patients with a history of persecutory delusions scored higher on
need for closure than the controls); Richard P. Bentall & Rebecca Swarbrick, The Best Laid
Schemas of Paranoid Patients: Autonomy, Sociotropy, and Need for Closure, 76 PSYCH. &
PSYCHOTHERAPY 163, 169 (2003) (finding that currently ill psychotic patients with persecutory
delusions and remitted paranoid patients scored higher on the need for closure, indicating a
high intolerance for ambiguity). But see Daniel Freeman, Philippa Garety, Elizabeth Kuipers,
Susannah Colbert, Suzanne Jolley, David Fowler, Graham Dunn & Paul Bebbington,
Delusions and Decision-Making Style: Use of the Need for Closure Scale, 44 BEHAV. RSCH.
& THERAPY 1147, 1155 (2006) (finding any potential effect of the need for closure on
psychotic symptoms was indirect and mediated through affect).
282. Garety & Freeman, supra note 132, at 328.
283. See Preti & Cella, supra note 190, at 263–64 (defining heuristic as “a highly
economical method of decision-making that can lead to systematic and predictable errors”).
284. Id.
285. Daniel Freeman, Philippa A. Garety, Elizabeth Kuipers, David Fowler, Paul E.
Bebbington & Graham Dunn, Acting on Persecutory Delusions: The Importance of Safety
Seeking, 45 BEHAV. RSCH. & THERAPY 89, 90 (2007) (defining safety-seeking behaviors as
“actions designed to prevent [a] feared catastrophe from occurring”); see also id. at 92–93
(enumerating several types of safety-seeking behaviors).
286. Id. at 93 (finding that ninety-six out of 100 participants with persecutory delusions
reported using safety-seeking behaviors within the previous month).
287. Id. at 96.
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belief.288 Importantly, novel cognitive and meta-cognitive therapies, which rely on
forced engagement of System 2 analytical reflection,289 demonstrate that
encouraging populations with persecutory delusions to consciously avoid use of
safety-seeking behaviors in a feared environment can drastically reduce delusional
conviction.290 This suggests that System 2, while not completely abolished, may be
impaired in populations with persecutory delusions, leading to overreliance on faulty
System 1.
b. Anger and Emotion Regulation Impairment
Difficulties in regulating emotions may contribute to the formation and
maintenance of persecutory delusions.291 Studies show that negative affect often
precedes paranoid ideation, which, in turn, leads to presentation of psychotic
symptoms.292 Negative affect may be, at least in part, the byproduct of an inability to
mitigate stress. One study of the effect of stress on populations with psychosis found

288. This feedback loop may continue where the individual continues engaging in safetyseeking behaviors when confronted with situations perceived as stressful or potentially
harmful. Since aggression is one of the commonly recognized safety-seeking behaviors, it
logically follows that each loop carries the risk of an aggressive reaction, which might lead to
violence. See infra notes 296–308.
289. Commonly used therapies include cognitive-based therapy (CBT) and metacognitive
training (MCT). See Tania M. Lincoln & Emmanuelle Peters, A Systematic Review and
Discussion of Symptom Specific Cognitive Behavioural Approaches to Delusions and
Hallucinations, 203 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 66, 66 (2017) (“The main instrument of change in
[CBT] involves reframing appraisals and modifying behavior related to psychotic symptoms,
to reduce distress and improve functioning and well-being.”); Steffen Moritz et al.,
Complementary Group Metacognitive Training (MCT) Reduces Delusional Ideation in
Schizophrenia, 151 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 61 (2013) (discussing MCT). Even beyond the use
of these therapies in addressing safety-seeking behaviors, the therapies have shown to be
effective in reducing delusional conviction and positive symptoms of psychosis more
generally. See, e.g., Lincoln & Peters, supra note 289, at 75–76; Steffen Moritz, Christina
Andreou, Brooke C. Schneider, Charlotte E. Wittekind, Mahesh Menon, Ryan P. Balzan &
Todd S. Woodward, Sowing the Seeds of Doubt: A Narrative Review on Metacognitive
Training in Schizophrenia, 34 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 358, 363–64 (2014).
290. See Daniel Freeman et al., Virtual Reality in the Treatment of Persecutory Delusions:
Randomised Controlled Experimental Study Testing How to Reduce Delusional Conviction,
209 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (2016) (using virtual reality environment to expose participants
to a feared environment and demonstrating that such exposure in conjunction with dropping
safety-seeking behaviors reduced delusional conviction significantly more than exposure
alone).
291. See Stefan Westermann & Tania M. Lincoln, Emotion Regulation Difficulties Are
Relevant to Persecutory Ideation, 84 PSYCH. & PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RSCH., & PRACTICE
273, 281–83 (2011).
292. See Ingrid Kramer, Claudia J. P. Simons, Johanna T. W. Wigman, Dina Collip, Nele
Jacobs, Catherine Derom, Evert Thiery, Jim van Os, Inez Myin-Germeys & Marieke Wichers,
Time-Lagged Moment-to-Moment Interplay Between Negative Affect and Paranoia: New
Insights in the Affective Pathway to Psychosis, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 278, 284 (2014)
(using time-lagged analysis to show that negative affect precedes everyday paranoia, which,
when accumulated, caused psychotic symptoms).

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 350

1/24/22 9:05 AM

2022]

CASE FOR MORAL WRONGFULNESS

339

that, within the psychosis group, the ability to accept and regulate emotions predicted
both the strength of the physiological response as well as the change in level of
paranoia.293 Research has also demonstrated that anxiety increases paranoid thoughts
and the occurrence of certain cognitive biases.294 Moreover, since populations with
delusions demonstrate impaired emotion regulation, it is plausible that populations
with persecutory delusions fail to down-regulate negative affect, which, when
accumulated, could lead to psychotic symptoms.295
This may lead to violent results, especially in situations involving intense anger.
Although most individuals with psychosis will never commit an act of violence, there
is a “modest but consistent association” between psychosis, particularly persecutory
delusions,296 and violent offending.297 Research has consistently demonstrated that
anger mediates the relationship between delusions and violence.298 A longitudinal
study of 1136 civil psychiatry inpatients after discharge found “strong associations”
between threat-based delusions, anger, and violence.299 This study found that anger

293. Lincoln et al., supra note 201, at 219–20; see supra text accompanying note 201.
294. See Steffen Mortiz, Pia Burnette, Sabine Sperber, Ulf Köther, Marion HagemannGoebel, Maike Hartmann & Tania M. Lincoln, Elucidating the Black Box from Stress to
Paranoia, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1311, 1311 (2011) (finding that stress increased paranoid
symptoms and significantly increased the jumping-to-conclusions bias in schizophrenia
patients with acute psychotic symptoms); Tania M. Lincoln, Jennifer Lange, Julia Burau,
Cornelia Exner & Steffen Moritz, The Effect of State Anxiety on Paranoid Ideation and
Jumping to Conclusions. An Experimental Investigation, 36 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1140,
1145–46 (2009) (finding that induced state anxiety increased paranoid thoughts and jumping
to conclusions in healthy participants vulnerable to psychosis symptoms); Steffen Moritz, R.
Veckenstedt, S. Randjbar, B. Hottenrott, T.S. Woodward, F.V. v. Eckstaedt, C. Schmidt, L
Jelinek & T. M. Lincoln, Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Mood Induction: Further
Evidence for Liberal Acceptance in Schizophrenia, 39 PSYCH. MED. 1821, 1827 (2009)
(finding that patients with delusions made decisions more quickly than healthy controls when
listening to anxiety-evoking music).
295. See Westermann & Lincoln, supra note 291, at 282 (“[T]he usually functional
emotion regulation strategy of reappraising emotional evocative situations in a neutral or nonthreatening manner could be corrupted by hasty decisions due to jumping-to-conclusions . . .
.”).
296. See Robert Keers, Simone Ullrich, Bianca L. DeStavola & Jeremy W. Coid,
Association of Violence with Emergence of Persecutory Delusions in Untreated
Schizophrenia, 171 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 332, 333, 335 (2014); Simone Ullrich, Robert Keers
& Jeremy W. Coid, Delusions, Anger, and Serious Violence: New Findings from the
MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1174, 1176–77 (2014).
297. Matthew M. Large & Olav Nielssen, Violence in First-Episode Psychosis: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 125 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 209, 209–10 (2011) (noting
that the risk of homicide in untreated schizophrenia is one in 630).
298. See Ullrich et al., supra note 296, at 1176–80; Coid et al., supra note 247, at 467–70;
Shuja Reagu, Roland Jones, Veena Kumari & Pamela J. Taylor, Angry Affect and Violence in
the Context of a Psychotic Illness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Literature,
146 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 46, 46–48 (2013) (including eleven studies with a variety of
psychiatric diagnoses and finding significantly higher anger scores for violent groups
compared to nonviolent groups).
299. See Ullrich et al., supra note 296, at 1178. The effect remained significant after
accounting for demographic characteristics, alcohol/drug use disorders and other comorbid
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mediated the pathway between serious violence and five delusion subtypes,
including “being spied upon, being followed, being plotted against, having thoughts
inserted, and being under external control.”300 The results of this study mirrored those
found in an earlier study, which considered 458 first-episode psychosis patients over
the twelve months prior to contact with psychiatric services.301 That study found
significant association between “serious” violence and delusions of being spied on,
persecution, and conspiracy—a pathway also mediated by anger due to delusional
beliefs.302 The consistency in these results is notable given the large sample sizes of
diverse populations at different stages in the course of psychiatric illness.303
Importantly, all of the delusional beliefs associated with violence imply threat to
the individual, which suggests that anger develops as a response to feelings of being
threatened.304 It is well accepted that “[t]hreat perception is fundamental to anger
activation,” as anger is viewed as a natural response to survival challenges.305 As
Raymond Novaco has observed, although “anger is neither necessary nor sufficient
for aggression or violence,” it does impel aggression, “particularly when its intensity
overrides regulatory control mechanisms.”306 These regulatory mechanisms require
reappraisal,307 which is impaired in populations with delusions, as previously
discussed.308
Thus, it is possible to construct a pathway leading to development and
maintenance of persecutory delusions resulting in acts of serious violence. Aberrant
stress response coupled with belief inflexibility and dysfunctional emotionregulation strategies may impede the down-regulation of angry affect and
reconsideration of a threat. The more intense the feelings of anger, the less likely the
individual will be able to down-regulate the anger, resulting in a higher likelihood of
serious violence. Consequently, because of her mental disorder, the deluded
individual could commit a serious violent act based on intuitions and without the
input of reflective thought.

pathology, substance use, and trait anger. Id.
300. Id. at 1176–79 (classifying violence as “serious” if it involved “(1) batteries that
resulted in physical injury or involved the use of a weapon; (2) sexual assaults; or (3) threats
made with a weapon in hand,” and noting that violent acts “committed in self-defense were
not counted as violent behavior”).
301. Coid et al., supra note 247, at 467–70.
302. Id. at 467–68 (defining “serious” violence as “assault resulting in injury or involving
use of a lethal weapon, threat with a lethal weapon, or sexual assault”).
303. Compare id. at 466–70 (assessing ethnically diverse individuals with first-episode
psychosis across a range of diagnoses over the twelve months preceding contact with
psychiatric services), with Ullrich et al., supra note 296, at 1175–76 (considering a large
sample with primarily white ethnic backgrounds and a variety of psychotic diagnoses in a
longitudinal study following discharge from acute inpatient facilities).
304. See Ullrich et al., supra note 296, at 1178–80.
305. Novaco, supra note 270, at 333.
306. Id. at 331.
307. Id. at 335.
308. See supra Part II.A.2.
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2. Subjectivizing the Insane Delusion Rule
M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule—and arguably the common stance that
“wrong” should be construed as “legal wrong”309—trains courtroom actors’ attention
on the content of a defendant’s delusions and whether, had they been real, they would
have provided a complete legal defense.310 Following courts’ lead, forensic
examiners scrutinize the delusional defendant’s objective in engaging in the criminal
act and emphasize that a moral incapacity assessment will typically turn on the
delusion’s conformance with a legal defense.311 As Richard Rogers writes in his
introduction to insanity evaluations, “[t]he crux of the determination can be stated
simply: If the defendant’s beliefs and perceptions were accurate, would they justify
his or her actions?”312 However, the justness of this approach turns on whether the
delusional defendant likely possessed—and could have fairly been expected to
exercise—adequate reasoning abilities while in the throes of psychosis.313
When drafted in 1843, M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule cohered with prevalent
theories of phrenology and monomania,314 which conceptualized the brain as
consisting of separate parts, whereby one area could be diseased while the others
remained unaffected.315 Under these theories, the insane delusion rule conceivably
made sense: if a delusion’s effect was confined to the content of that delusion, its
holder could be expected to engage in sound moral decision-making around that
content.316 Commentators have long recognized that the insane delusion rule operates
similarly to the mistake-of-fact doctrine, with delusion substituting for the
reasonableness of the mistake.317 In essence, the rule subjectivizes the mistake-of-

309. More than a dozen states define “wrong” as illegal, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021,
1035 n.10 (2020) (listing sixteen states), while the majority conceptualize wrongfulness as
contrary to public or societal standards of morality, State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 184
(Iowa 1979). Public morality usually equates to legality, however, because insanity cases
typically involve serious crimes. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52. For a discussion of the
interconnectedness of the insane delusion rule and moral incapacity, see infra note 325.
310. Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1842–43.
311. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 109; Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 26, at 357.
312. Rogers, supra note 4, at 109.
313. For this reason, a number of courts have declined to follow the insane delusion rule.
See Ryan v. People, 153 P. 756, 759 (Colo. 1915) (“It practically holds a man, confessed to be
insane, accountable for the exercise of the same reason, judgment, and controlling mental
power that is required of a man in perfect mental health.”); infra note 371 (listing cases
rejecting insane delusion rule).
314. See GLUECK, supra note 241, at 169–70; G.W. KEETON, GUILTY BUT INSANE 193
(1961).
315. See WEIHOFEN, supra note 35, at 110 (describing “monomania” as “essentially a state
of mind characterized by the predominance of one insane idea, while the rest of the mind was
normal” and “phrenology” as the “theory that the brain was a bundle of some twenty-seven
different organs presiding over the different traits of the individual”).
316. HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS 215 (1909)
(“The theory . . . of the English law then is that an isolated delusion lies imbedded, like a
foreign body, in a brain which is and remains normal all around.”).
317. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 965 (3d ed. 1982); Edwin
R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 87 (1908);
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fact rule—completely. In limiting the rule to defendants who “labour[] under . . .
partial delusion only, and [are] not in other respects insane,” the justices in
M’Naghten expressed their belief that, by treating the defendant “as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists were real,” they were taking into account every
aspect of the defendant’s mental disorder.318 The rule directs the trier of fact to stand
in the shoes of the disordered defendant, view circumstances as she perceived them,
and then apply the law that applies to everyone else.
Application of the rule’s logic in light of modern science requires the trier of fact,
when viewing the world from the perspective of the defendant, to take into account
every aspect of her mental disorder, including any related cognitive and emotional
dysfunction.319 In this way, the rule would comport with the modern trend to
subjectivize the criminal law, including defenses.320 Only by interpreting the
situation from the defendant’s viewpoint and psychological context can the trier of
fact assess the defendant’s culpability in responding to that situation.321 However,
doing so will likely reveal the incoherence and inhumanity of the current formulation
of the rule, which only excuses the conduct of delusional defendants whose
objectives (within their warped perception of reality and disordered frame of

OPPENHEIMER, supra note 316, at 218.
318. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211 (1843); supra note
229.
319. Admittedly, although this approach would satisfy the logic of the rule, it apparently
would contradict its express language. See supra note 229.
320. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability
in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1217–20 (2000) [hereinafter Slobogin, An End to
Insanity]. Christopher Slobogin has proposed something similar with his Integrationist Test.
See id. at 1236 (proposing “the insanity defense should be abolished and . . . people with
mental disorder should have a complete defensive claim only when they lack mens rea or act
for reasons that sound in justification or duress,” such that they would satisfy the MPC’s
justification or duress standard); Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test as
a Replacement for the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523, 541 n.123
(2009) [hereinafter Slobogin, A Defense] (noting that M’Naghten’s insane delusion test is
“very similar” to the Integrationist Test he proposes). The proposal ultimately offered in this
Article differs from his in key respects, however. See infra notes 330–331 and accompanying
text.
321. See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1851 (proposing a jury instruction that the
jury, when assessing a delusional defendant’s ignorance of the wrongfulness of her act,
“attempt to interpret and experience the delusional facts as the defendant would have in that
moment—or . . . [stated differently], from the viewpoint of the defendant”). For an example
of subjectivation in the context of delusion-driven crime, see United States v. Mott, 72 M.J.
319, 333 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (“Under the defense theory, Appellant’s schizophrenia not only
made him think that JG was the gang leader who previously raped and tried to kill him and
now was back to kill him, but also that he faced imminent death and had no option but to kill
JG. Even if a rational person would have understood that he could report JG to the authorities
or run away, Appellant asserted that he was unable to process these options like a rational
person, and therefore was unable to appreciate that he was not acting in self-defense by
attacking JG—that is, Appellant was unable to appreciate that attacking JG was wrongful.”);
Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1808–10 (discussing this case in the context of the insane
delusion rule).
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reasoning) happened to accord with the rules of conduct required for individuals with
sound decision-making abilities.
Subjecting the Rowl hypothetical to the insane delusion rule under a subjective
approach is illustrative. Rowl’s disorder likely made him especially attentive to
threat-relevant information (the missing gun) consistent with his paranoid delusions.
This attentional bias, in concert with cognitive biases to make strong judgments
based on little information, distorted his representation of reality with a delusional
connotation. The missing gun alerted him to a possible threat, worried him, and
directed further attention to that fact as well as to associated paranoia-relevant
information in local and temporal proximity. Evidence integration biases may have
impaired Rowl’s ability to revise his belief in light of contradictory evidence (the
planned hunting trip and missing cap), thus cementing his paranoid belief and
increasing delusional conviction. Manifesting hostile intent attribution bias, Rowl
attributed aggression to his father’s taking of the gun, experienced a heightened
perception of harm, and responded in a hostile and angry manner. Feelings of stress
and anxiety likely stoked his feelings of paranoia, magnified the effect of his
jumping-to-conclusions bias, reduced his ability to engage in deliberative processing,
and contributed to his interpreting the ambiguous statement—“he will have to be
stopped”—as confirmation of impending harm. His distorted perception of reality
hindered his ability to generate options for action and colored his evaluation of
options generated.322 Rowl’s mounting fear resulted in overwhelming anger, which
ultimately overrode his impaired regulatory control mechanisms, impelling
aggression. As an expert witness testified in the trial that inspired these facts, “he
was at the mercy of his rage, which effectively prevented him from reflecting on his
actions or taking into consideration the consequences of his behavior.”323
Instructing the trier of fact to interpret and experience the delusional facts as Rowl
would have in that moment—given the cognitive and emotional impairments
associated with his paranoid schizophrenia—and assess whether, had that situation
been accurate, his action would have been legally justified, may leave the jury
bewildered and disturbed. If the perceived circumstances had been real, then Rowl’s
parents, with a history of trying to kill him with poisoned vitamins, had removed his
sole means of defense and just voiced plans to murder him. Experiencing the
delusional facts as Rowl likely did, the jurors would believe Rowl felt overwhelming
fear, panic, and rage, rendering him unable to notice evidence that contradicted his
persecutory delusion and incapable of generating and evaluating alternative courses
of action. In that predicament, would taking his father’s life appear necessary to him
to prevent death or serious bodily harm? If so, perhaps he should be acquitted on
grounds of insanity. If not, he may be guilty of murder.

322. Annemarie Kalis & Gerben Meynen, Mental Disorder and Legal Responsibility: The
Relevance of Stages of Decision Making, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 601, 603–07 (2014)
(discussing effect of delusions on generation of options of action and selection among those
options); id. at 606 (“In this selection stage, there does not seem to be room for contemplations
like: Is it really true that I am being persecuted . . . ? The nature of delusions is such that beliefs
produced by them are in fact unshakable, and all the alternative options are likely to arise
within the constraints of the person’s distorted perception.”).
323. State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. 1972).
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As this discussion illustrates, research demonstrates the fallacy of presuming a
psychotic defendant can soundly reason about the content of her delusions.324
Certainly delusional circumstances that, if true, would have provided a legal defense
demonstrate the defendant’s ignorance of the wrongfulness of her criminal act.
However, given the cognitive and emotional impairments associated with delusions,
it is not necessarily the case that a delusion whose perceived circumstances fall just
outside the contours of a legal defense signals moral blameworthiness. A different,
more just, approach is needed to ensure that the moral quality of the defendant’s
objective, within her psychological context, is properly reflected in the sanity
evaluation.
3. Broadening the Meaning of “Wrongfulness”
Subjectivizing the insane delusion rule challenges the logic and fundamental
fairness of defining “wrong” as illegal—both within the context of the rule itself and
for purposes of moral incapacity.325 As Edwin Keedy asserted in 1908:
In order that the defendant may escape criminal liability because he acted
under an insane delusion it is clear that the standard of an ordinary,
reasonable man cannot be applied, because the definition of delusion
indicates that the belief of the defendant is not in accord with the
impression which would ordinarily be obtained from the situation by the
use of the senses.326

324. The central scientific insight offered in this article—that the presence of delusions
suggests a disordered reasoning process especially likely to generate irrational and impulsive
judgments in the context of those delusions—has been offered many times in the past. See
Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1788 n.46.
325. Scholars and courts have recognized (and debated) the intimate relationship between
the insane delusion rule and the general test for moral incapacity. See WEIHOFEN, supra note
35, at 107–08 (“[S]ince the judges were not professing to reform or modify the law, but merely
to state the law of England as it then was, it seems that this mistake of fact test was not intended
by the judges as a distinct test, but as entirely consistent with the right and wrong test they had
just set forth.”); Dennis R. Klinck, “Specific Delusions” in the Insanity Defence, 25 CRIM.
L.Q. 458, 466–70 (1983) (considering and rejecting the view that the insane delusion rule is a
separate test from the general rule); Mott, 72 M.J. at 324–26 (stating that “evidence that—if
the facts of the accused’s delusions were true—then his conduct would not violate the law”
would demonstrate he did not appreciate his act’s wrongfulness); United States v. Ewing, 494
F.3d 607, 619–20 (7th Cir. 2007) (using the insane delusion rule to inform its definition of
“wrong” for purposes of moral incapacity). The tests are clearly synergistic. See Johnston &
Leahey, supra note 2, at 1842–43 (explaining why “the insane delusion rule may reduce the
defendant’s likelihood of ultimately prevailing” on the moral incapacity test). Case law
suggests that, even in jurisdictions that espouse a moral (not legal) wrong standard for
purposes of moral incapacity, application of the insane delusion may largely dictate the result
of the general wrongfulness inquiry. See People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 914 (Ct. App.
2015), as modified on denial of reh’g (2015); Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 26, at 362
(opining that the narrow definition of morality in California basically eliminates the distinction
between moral and legal wrongfulness); infra note 366 and accompanying text.
326. Keedy, supra note 317, at 88.
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Assessing circumstances from the viewpoint of a paranoid defendant with serious
mental disorder might lead a trier of fact to conclude that the defendant’s ability to
deliberate upon her response to a perceived threat was so impaired, and the emotions
propelling her to action so great, that she cannot fairly be blamed for acting on her
fear; in other words, her response—although disproportionate for a “reasonable”
person—was understandable.327 Under this logic, the science of delusions suggests
the trier of fact should be permitted to consider whether the delusions that propelled
a criminal act and generally cohere to the basic thrust of a justification or excuse so
affected the defendant’s “experience of choosing” and the moral quality of her act
that the defendant should not be subject to moral censure.328
This proposal appears to differ significantly from that proposed by Christopher
Slobogin. Slobogin has argued that “the insanity defense should be abolished and . .
. people with mental disorder should have a complete defensive claim only when
they lack mens rea or act for reasons that sound in justification or duress”329 such
that they would satisfy the MPC’s justification or duress standard.330 Slobogin would
recognize as exculpatory, for instance, a delusional belief that “such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting [the defendant] against the use
of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”331 Thus, a defendant
would have a viable defense if she proved to the trier of fact that her use of force was
objectively proportionate to what she believed the victim was threatening and that
she believed the force was necessary to prevent the victim’s attack. However, the
MPC’s definition of a justification or excuse may well be more demanding than what
a jury would find necessary to satisfy the gist of that justification or excuse in a
particular jurisdiction for purpose of the insanity defense.332 In this way, the proposal

327. Crucially, this Article does not advocate for a completely subjective moral
wrongfulness standard. Persuasive arguments exist for why “wrong” should hew to societal
standards of morality. See State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 493 (Wash. 1983) (en banc);
People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
328. See Richard J. Bonnie, Presentation at Conference on the Affirmative Defense of
Insanity in Texas: Why “Appreciation of Wrongfulness” Is the Morally Preferable Standard
for the Insanity Defense 55 (Feb. 7, 2003) (transcript available at https://www.txpsych.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/insanitytranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RVC-5EM3]). Of course, it
will be up to the trier of fact to determine whether within the perceived circumstances of the
defendant’s delusion—with her mentally diseased mindset and emotional composition—she
believed her actions cohered with societal morality (and, within the circumstances as she
perceived them, would have), such that she was unable to appreciate the fundamental
wrongfulness of her act. For issues to consider (and questions to ask) when assessing a
delusional defendant’s objectives in the context of misperceived threats or responsibilities, see
Rogers, supra note 4, at 109.
329. Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 320, at 1246.
330. Id. at 1218–20.
331. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985); see Slobogin, An End to Insanity,
supra note 320, at 1218–20.
332. Cf. infra notes 373–76 (discussing justificatory content of delusions in jurisdictions
not employing a legal wrong standard). The MPC could be useful, though, in supplying an
“external, objective standard” by which to measure the defendant’s delusional justificatory or
excusing belief in those jurisdictions with such a requirement for the insanity defense. See
infra notes 363, 365–70 and accompanying text (discussing California case law).
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offered here more forcefully delinks the excuse from the necessity component of the
delusional justification.
Expanding the standard of legality used in the insane delusion rule to capture a
broader conception of justified or excused action would permit expression of societal
notions of morality for delusion-driven behavior.333 Scholars often argue that “the
distinction between legal and moral wrong is, on the whole, unimportant; for as to
most serious antisocial acts, law and morals are indistinguishable.”334 The most
commonly recognized difference between the two standards appears in the context
of deific decrees.335 Results under the two standards may also differ, however, in
cases of perceived justified action.336
Indeed, applying an understanding of “wrong” broader than illegal to delusiondriven behavior—at least through the moral incapacity test337—appears consistent
with M’Naghten’s Case.338 The English judges defined “wrong” as a moral wrong
that is also contrary to law in the context of the general wrongfulness test of
insanity.339 The judges made clear this standard should apply “in all cases,” including
“where a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion[s] respecting one or more
particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime.”340 On the
other hand, the judges expressly limited the standard of legal wrongfulness to the
context of “those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not
in other respects insane,”341 which shows this stricter standard applies only when no

333. Importantly, the components of “know” and “wrong” are reciprocally related, and the
meanings of one or both may allow a finding of insanity on the basis of perceived justification.
On the one hand, a person who, because of a mental illness-induced delusion, believed her
criminal act to be morally justified could be found irresponsible because she did not know her
act was morally wrong. On the other hand, she also probably could be found insane on the
basis that she lacked a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminal wrongfulness of her act.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 170 (AM. L. INST. 1985); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at
52–53.
334. GLUECK, supra note 241, at 220; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52–53.
335. Margaret E. Clark, The Immutable Command Meets the Unknowable Mind: Deific
Decree Claims and the Insanity Defense After People v. Serravo, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 161,
168 (1992) (asserting that “the occurrence of the deific decree is recognized as the only general
instance of wrong as purely moral wrong”).
336. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 169–70 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (noting that the
difference between legal and moral wrong may “matter significantly . . . where the
wrongfulness standard is taken to refer to the actor’s own moral perception . . . in a case in
which the defendant thinks that an act he knows to be legally prohibited is commanded by
God or otherwise morally justified”) (emphasis added); see infra notes 367–70 (listing
illustrative cases).
337. See supra note 325.
338. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 135–36 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); People v.
Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 946–48 (N.Y. 1915).
339. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843) (“If the
accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the
same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable . . . .”).
340. Id. at 209.
341. Id. at 211; see supra note 229.
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additional symptoms of mental disorder are present.342 Indeed, the court stressed the
test must “depend on the nature of the delusion,” indicating that delusions not partial
should be held to the moral wrong standard applicable to the general test.343 Also,
the judges might have intended the insane delusion doctrine merely to provide an
example of moral incapacity, not to define wrongfulness.344 Finally—and perhaps
most decisively—the fundamental task of the English judges in M’Naghten was to
articulate the governing law of insanity (not to divine a new test),345 and English
common law had consistently understood wrongfulness to reflect “principles of
general morality rather than . . . enactments of positive law.”346
Adopting an expanded understanding of wrongfulness within the insane delusion
rule would resemble the moral incapacity tests currently employed by a subset of
jurisdictions with a societal morality standard. As legal scholar Kate Bloch and
forensic psychiatrist Jeffery Gould explain, under a “hybrid” approach to societal
moral wrongfulness,
the trier of fact would . . . look through the microscope to see the event
through the defendant’s delusion, but in evaluating whether the event
violated society’s morals, the trier of fact would apply society’s view of
the conduct. . . . . [T]he trier of fact would presumably apply some
reasonable person, or more generalized societal vantage point, or the
principles of the criminal code itself, to assess whether society would
find [the defendant’s] conduct morally wrong.347
Thus, in these jurisdictions, a defendant’s sanity would turn on the “trier of fact’s
perception of whether society would find that conduct violated societal morality.”348
The modified insane delusion rule proposed by this Article would operate
similarly. A forensic expert would assist the trier of fact to see and understand the
relevant events from the perspective of the delusional defendant. Attention would
focus on the defendant’s motivations and reasons for acting. The expert would testify
to the defendant’s perception of external circumstances, associated emotions,
cognitive and emotional dysfunctions, and reasoning processes at the moment of the
criminal act. When the defendant acted for delusional reasons that sound in
justification or excuse, the court would instruct the trier of fact to assess

342. See supra notes 228, 314–15.
343. M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211; see also supra note 229.
344. I am grateful to Chris Slobogin for offering this observation.
345. See M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 208 (noting that the judges were “confin[ing]
their answers to the statement of that which they hold to be the law upon the abstract questions
proposed by [the House of Lords]”).
346. HENRY MONTAGU RANDALL POPE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LUNACY
385 (2d ed. 1890); see Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and
Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States:
An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227, 1233–37, 1247–48 (1966) (tracing the history
of “knowledge of right and wrong” prior to M’Naghten and concluding that, “during the early
nineteenth century, the phrases ‘good and evil’ and ‘right and wrong’ were used
interchangeably and synonymously”); People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 946–47 (N.Y. 1915).
347. Bloch & Gould, supra note 235, at 934.
348. Id. at 935.
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wrongfulness from a “generalized societal vantage point” informed by the underlying
principles or thrust of the criminal code, as opposed to its particulars. Particularly
important would be whether (and why) the defendant believed the act was necessary.
The ultimate focus should be whether the delusions so affected the defendant’s
decision-making and the moral quality of her act that she should be excused from
moral censure.
The benefits of assessing a delusional defendant’s objectives by societal views of
morality (or a looser view of legality) rather than strict legality—both in the context
of the insane delusion rule and the general moral incapacity test—are substantial.
First, such a standard would allow consideration of the moral nature of the
defendant’s action within her particular psychological context.349 Second, while
factoring in “the baneful effects of various forms of mental illness on the cognitive
capacity of the human mind,”350 this standard would be sufficiently objective, as it
would reflect the trier of fact’s understanding of generally accepted standards of
morality as opposed to a defendant’s personal moral code.351 Third, it avoids the
perplexing and likely disturbing task of holding a psychotic defendant to typical
standards of rationality and thus may resolve possible issues of jury confusion.352
Finally, a moral (or broader legal) standard avoids probing the complexities of a
delusion and the imagination of the delusional defendant to determine if all
preconditions of a legal defense would have been satisfied had the delusion been
real.353 Additionally, juries inevitably “exercise a moral judgment as to the sanity of
the accused,”354 so such a standard makes both theoretical and pragmatic sense.
However, subjecting a defendant’s delusional reasoning to a broader legal wrong
standard—perhaps especially in the case of misperceived threats355—is not immune

349. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 135–36 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (“[W]e are of
the view that limiting the definition of ‘wrong’ to ‘legal wrong’ results in stripping legal
insanity of a significant part of its psychological components.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note
32, at 344 (“Use of the term criminality suggests to triers of fact that they ignore even the most
florid effects of delusions and hallucinations in any case in which a defendant’s conduct would
still be criminal had the delusions been true or the hallucinations real.”).
350. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 137.
351. See id. at 138.
352. See Fred Cohen, Insanity and the Law: Toward a Rational Development of Criminal
Responsibility, 39 DICTA 325, 333 (1962) (discussing the plight of a juror who “decried the
lack of dignity in the proceedings, the communication barriers, and the jury’s inability to reach
a rational decision”); supra note 326 and accompanying text.
353. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 502 (2d ed. 1961)
(“Only an exceptionally clear-headed lunatic would be able to furnish all these details of his
delusion.”).
354. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 649 (9th Cir. 1957), overruled in part by Wade
v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); see Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
666–67 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (“The application of these tests [of insanity] . . . to a borderline case
can be nothing more than a moral judgment that it is just or unjust to blame the defendant for
what he did.”).
355. See People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 914 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
“[w]hatever may be the standard for knowing an act is morally compelled is of no moment”
because the defendant’s “conduct was based on the legal doctrine of self-defense”), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 27, 2015).
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from objections.356 One serious objection to permitting exculpation when a
delusional defendant believed she acted in accord with the general thrust of a legal
defense is that no consensus exists on what a “general thrust” would mean,357 so such
a stance would be akin to endorsing a personal standard of morality.358 This could
imperil the “certainty, objectivity or security for evaluation by the courts or society
at large.”359 Sanctioning a personal code of morality could undercut the normative
function of the law and reduce its deterrent force. For instance, the California
Supreme Court found that a “schizophrenic and paranoid” defendant’s genuine belief
that he was justified “according to defendant’s personal, prison-influenced
standards” in killing a fellow inmate who threatened a future attack did not require a
finding of moral incapacity.360 The court explained, “This is necessarily so if
organized society is to formulate standards of conduct and responsibility deemed
essential to its preservation or welfare, and to require compliance, within tolerances,
with those standards.”361
Consequently, states have struggled to balance deference to the jury’s assessment
of generally accepted standards of morality with a desire to tether misperceived harm
allegations to external, objective standards. California provides a good example. The
state allows a delusion’s strict conformance to a legal justification to establish a
defendant’s inability to understand wrongfulness in the context of an insane delusion
case.362 However, when the perceived facts of a delusion would not have provided a
defense, a mental disease may still support a finding of moral insanity so long as the
defendant adduces additional evidence of (a) actual belief that her actions were
morally justified according to her perception of generally accepted ethical or moral
principles derived from an external source,363 or (b) an inability (i.e., a lack of the

356. Others may argue no principled reason exists to privilege delusions of justification or
excuse; rather, irresponsibility should turn on “the ‘intensity of the psychotic experience,’
meaning the degree to which psychosis detaches the individual from reality” or “the ability to
correct factual premises.” Slobogin, A Defense, supra note 320, at 535–36 (describing Richard
Bonnie’s objection to Slobogin’s Integrationist Test and the position of Stephen Morse and
Morris Hoffman). However, unlike Slobogin’s Integrationist Test, the proposal offered here is
not to limit mental-disorder-related exculpation to delusional “reasons that sound in
justification or duress.” Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 320, at 1246 (also
recognizing exculpation when mental disorder negates mens rea). Rather, this Article
recognizes an irresponsibility framework that includes an insane delusion rule, both because
that rule may hold value and because, regardless of its value, courts actively employ the rule.
See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2. Its argument is that one way to apply the rule justly may
be to factor a delusional defendant’s reasoning impairments into the rule by dislodging its
tethering to strict illegality in favor of a broader sense of social morality.
357. Cohen, supra note 33, at 52–54.
358. See State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 1979) (holding that “wrong” should
only be considered in its legal capacity because a moral standard would be “amorphous and
shifting” and “therefore invite[] the functional equivalent of jury nullification”).
359. Clark, supra note 335 at 178.
360. People v. Rittger, 355 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1960).
361. Id. at 653.
362. People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 762 n.13 (Cal. 1985).
363. See People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1144 (Cal. 2000), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Sept. 27, 2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Super. Ct., 25 P.3d 618 (Cal.
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cognitive abilities necessary) to understand the wrongfulness of her act.364 While
morality “need not reflect the principles of a recognized religion and does not
demand belief in a God or other supreme being, it does require a sincerely held belief
grounded in generally accepted ethical or moral principles derived from an external
source.”365
Appellate court decisions show California courts’ struggle to fairly apply the
external source requirement in moral incapacity cases involving delusional,
misperceived threats of harm. At least one court has held that, when a defendant’s
perceived moral justification sounds in self-defense, generally accepted moral
standards equate to those of legality, necessitating that the trial court provide jury
instructions on the perceived (delusional) defense so the jury can properly evaluate
the moral incapacity claim.366 Other cases suggest less rigorous enforcement of the
external source requirement in cases of delusional threats of harm or perceived
necessity.367 Most provocatively, one appellate opinion indicates that acts taken in

2001).
364. Cf. Skinner, 704 P.2d at 762 n.13 (observing that the second delusion mentioned in
M’Naghten—“that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and
he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury”—“without more, does not suggest that the
defendant believes his act is lawful or morally justified” (emphasis added)). See supra Part
II.A.
365. Coddington, 2 P.3d at 1144.
366. See People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 912 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Without applying
the facts as [the defendant] perceived them to the law of self-defense, the jury would have no
way of evaluating whether his paranoid schizophrenia rendered him incapable of appreciating
the wrongfulness of his actions.”), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 27, 2015). Perhaps for
this reason, forensic mental health professionals have opined that the narrow definition of
morality in California basically eliminates the distinction between moral and legal
wrongfulness. Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 26, at 362.
367. See People v. Nelson, A094445, 2003 WL 1958803, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28,
2003) (quoting approvingly this closing argument, in a case involving perceived threat of harm
from the victim’s father as well as personal religious views, as consistent with the moral wrong
standard: “The position of the defense expressed during closing argument was that defendant
felt a ‘moral responsibility’ as a mother to ‘protect her child,’ not as a ‘moral standard that
reflects her distorted thinking,’ but as ‘one of the most commonly-understood phenomenas of
human nature. It goes to the heart of our concept of morality. Her reasons for thinking the
child needed protection may have been distorted, may have been delusional. But the act of
protecting your baby from harm is accepted and respected by our society”); People v. Stress,
252 Cal. Rptr. 913, 923 (Ct. App. 1988) (observing that “Appellant’s explanation for killing
his wife was liberally sprinkled with comments indicating her death would contribute to some
higher good” and thus might have qualified for insanity under a moral wrong theory); People
v. Mills, No. E028485, 2002 WL 1309128, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2002) (upholding
jury instructions and observing: “[The jury] would have considered any moral standard,
including one that approves of euthanasia, provided it viewed such a standard as ‘generally
accepted.’ It would then have asked whether defendant knew that his conduct violated even
such a standard. It evidently found that mercy killing is not a generally accepted moral standard
and/or that defendant knew he was not engaged in a mercy killing”); People v. O’Rourke, No.
D062132, 2013 WL 6154369, at *2–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (affirming conviction
and discussing the jury’s apparent rejection of defendant’s argument that he lacked the ability
to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of his act because he killed elementary school children
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delusional, perceived self-defense or defense of others—even if the alleged facts
would not clearly satisfy the legal criteria of either defense368—may warrant a
finding of insanity under M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule.369 Still, other cases
suggest that how near a delusion comes to meeting the elements of the perceived
defense contributes to the evaluation of moral incapacity.370
To the extent courts fear that explicitly endorsing a looser standard of legal wrong
in the context of perceived justification or excuse could veer too close to a subjective
standard, courts could opt to reject the insane delusion rule and simply employ the
jurisdiction’s moral incapacity test, defining “wrong” in reference to society’s moral
standards or leaving the term undefined.371 Indeed, appellate decisions suggest that
simply not defining “wrong” for the jury—the majority approach372—could yield the
results anticipated by allowing the gist of a perceived legal defense to satisfy the
insane delusion rule.373 Jurisdictions not defining “wrong” often permit a broader,
more general understanding of legal defenses—particularly self-defense—to
permeate insanity cases.374 In these jurisdictions, the defendant’s subjective sense of
justification may factor into the general right-wrong calculus without being subjected

in an effort to stop longstanding perceived persecution, including torture, threats to his life,
holding him captive, and making false claims he committed rape, and stressing: “This is not a
case where a defendant attacked his perceived persecutors”); see infra note 369 (discussing
People v. Torres).
368. See People v. Torres, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 521–22 (Ct. App. 2005) (reporting the
defendant’s belief he was the “Victim of a Medical Conspiracy” in which doctors, over the
course of ten years, “had injected him with ‘a deadly experiment,’ possibly the AIDS virus”
and were now refusing to help him).
369. In Torres, the appellate court reversed the jury’s finding of sanity because the trial
court’s instruction required the defendant to prove his inability to distinguish both legal and
moral wrong. Id. at 526. The court explained: Defendant offered evidence that he was suffering
under the delusion that doctors were injecting him and others with lethal materials and that he
felt morally justified in killing doctors to protect himself and others. A jury could accept this
evidence as establishing that defendant could not distinguish between moral right and moral
wrong. As stated in M’Naghten’s Case, “[I]f under the influence of his delusion he supposes
another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he
supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment.” Defendant had the right to
have the jury make the determination whether he fell within that rubric, but the erroneous
instruction denied him of that right. Id.
370. See People v. Dennis, No. B236745, 2013 WL 3853178, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. July
24, 2013) (“Whether appellant acted in revenge or to prevent further harm or death was a
factor relevant to whether appellant knew that what she did was morally wrong, whether or
not that factor was also relevant to whether she knew that what she did was legally wrong.”).
371. See, e.g., Ryan v. People, 153 P. 756, 758 (Colo. 1915); Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854,
866 (Ala. 1887); Kearney v. State, 8 So. 292, 292 (Miss. 1890); Kraus v. State, 187 N.W. 895,
899 (Neb. 1922). For a discussion of possible benefits engendered by the insane delusion rule,
see Johnston & Leahey, supra note 2, at 1837–41.
372. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52; State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 1979).
373. See, e.g., State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1178–79 (La. 1979); State v.
Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 497 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 500
(Ala. Crim. App. 1996); supra note 356356 (explaining the intent of the proposal).
374. See infra note 375.
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to an elemental analysis.375 Case law suggests that subjectively feeling justified—
when the facts, as believed, generally cohere with the basic thrust of the justification
(even if, admittedly, quite warped)—will militate in support of the defendant’s
general insanity claim. Indeed, Daniel M’Naghten, whose delusions of persecution
(if true) would likely not have justified using deadly defensive force, seems to have
benefited from such a sentiment.376 Crucially, to achieve results similar to those that
could be reached with a broader insane delusion rule, forensic practice would need
to recognize the potentially exculpatory nature of a larger swath of delusions. Some
forensic treatises and practice guides appear to support this practice now.377
A final benefit of expanding the insane delusion rule to recognize the exculpatory
nature of delusions consistent with the gist of a legal defense—or of allowing the
jury to employ their own notions of morality in this setting—may be that doing so
would comport with what Norman Finkel has called “commonsense justice,” the

375. See, e.g., State v. Chanthabouly, 262 P.3d 144, 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (approving
the trial court’s decision to permit the defendant to introduce evidence and argument that he
acted under a delusional belief of self-defense without reference to the elements of that
defense); State v. Dangerfield, 214 So. 3d 1001, 1018–19 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that
Louisiana courts, to reverse a conviction on grounds of insanity, typically require a showing
that the defendant “articulated to a degree [her] belief that there was some justification” for
her alleged criminal act and briefly discussing relevant cases); Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454,
458–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (reluctantly affirming conviction but emphasizing the near certain
“conclusion” that the defendant held a “‘firmly sustained’ belief that [the victim] was a witch
from which he needed to protect himself” without mentioning that the perceived facts, if true,
would not have permitted deadly force); Dixon v. State, 668 So. 2d 65, 72 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994) (reversing a conviction for attempted murder of a police officer in part because of
“evidence that the appellant was suffering from a delusion that the assault was necessary to
ensure the appellant’s safety”); State v. Roy, 395 So. 2d 664, 668 (La. 1981) (reversing a
conviction where the defendant was “markedly preoccupied with blacks and their ‘evil’
nature” and felt that “he was going to war for his country” and was “executing God’s will”).
376. Daniel M’Naughten, in his single public statement concerning his motive, explained,
[The Tories] follow, persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed my
peace of mind. . . . I cannot sleep nor get no rest from them in consequence of the
course they pursue towards me . . . They have accused me of crimes of which I am
not guilty, they do everything in their power to harass and persecute me; in fact, they
wish to murder me.
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
MCNAUGHTAN 10 (1981). As the Nevada Supreme Court observed, “M’Naghten was not
legally insane because, even if his delusion were true and the prime minister was conspiring
to kill M’Naghten, this would not entitle M’Naghten to take the law into his own hands and
hunt down the prime minister.” Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 73 (Nev. 2001) (mistakenly
attributing this conclusion to the House of Lords).
377. See ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 17, at 200 (“Impaired knowledge of wrongfulness
is most commonly observed with instances of misperceived necessity for self-defense. We use
‘self-defense’ as a descriptive term to represent the defendant’s general motivation and not as
strictly deﬁned afﬁrmative defense. . . . Conclusions about impaired knowledge of
wrongfulness must take into account the degree of threat (e.g., death vs. slanderous letters)
and its immediacy.”).
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ordinary person’s notions of what is blameworthy and what is not.378 Research
suggests that jurors may consider delusional, general motives of self-defense or
defense of others to be exculpatory. A few of the small number of studies on the
effect of delusional content have found that mock jurors tend to deem action tied
delusionally to a crime—regardless of the delusion’s strict conformance with a legal
justification379—exculpable on grounds of mental disorder, especially if the behavior
appeared relatively unplanned.380 For example, in a mock jury study involving 289
participants, psychologists Caton Roberts and Stephen Golding found that verdict
distributions in a murder case were not influenced by whether delusional content
involved self-defense (“in imminent danger of being ‘exterminated’”) or a belief of
persecution without fear of death.381 While subjects distinguished defendants by their
perceived degree of imminent danger and appreciation of wrongfulness, they found
both defendants equally nonculpable because of their incapacity to act differently.382
Other studies have found “the emotion of fear (e.g., the desire to protect oneself, as
in the rape and self-defense cases) generally leads to a true not guilty, whereas other
strong emotions (e.g., jealousy, envy, anger, betrayal, revenge, sexual desire)
typically lead to a true guilty verdict.”383
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STEPS
This Article uses the origins of modern insanity tests and the science of delusions
to argue that a broader range of cognitive and emotional impairments should factor
into insanity cases. M’Naghten’s Case expressly links knowledge to reasoning, so
any impairment destructive of rationality should be as relevant to moral incapacity
in jurisdictions requiring ignorance of an act’s wrongfulness as in those focusing on
inability to appreciate it. More controversially, the Article also argues that research
on the cognitive and emotional impairments associated with delusions, particularly
with regard to persecutory delusions, calls for a different assessment of the

378. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW
(1995).
379. Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal
Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349, 359–60 (1991).
380. See Caton F. Roberts, Stephen L. Golding & Frank D. Fincham, Implicit Theories of
Criminal Responsibility, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 225 (1987) (finding in a study of 181
undergraduates that 95% of subjects arrived at NGRI judgments when crime-relevant
delusions were combined with lack of painfulness, and concluding that “the prototypic insanity
acquittee acts impulsively in response to a crime-relevant delusional idea”); Roberts &
Golding, supra note 379, at 359–60 (finding, in a mixed sample of 145 undergraduates and
144 community members, that the relative probability of an NGRI verdict was 40% for planful
conduct and 54% for nonplanful defendants).
381. Roberts & Golding, supra note 379, at 359–60; see id. at 355 (describing delusional
content of vignettes).
382. Id. at 358–59. The researchers concluded, “The degree of delusional involvement in
the mens rea of even the non-self-defense cases led a majority of subjects to conclude that it
was not just to find criminal guilt in such persons despite the degree of apparent capacity for
criminal intent and appreciation evidenced by the defendant.” Id. at 370.
383. Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, Crime Prototypes, Objective Versus
Subjective Culpability, and Commonsense Balance, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225 (1997).
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defendant’s state of knowledge. Currently, forensic practice guides, court decisions,
and a dominant understanding of “wrong” indicate that a defendant will only be
found ignorant of the wrongfulness of her delusion-fueled criminal act if the
circumstances of her delusion, had they been real, would have provided a legal
defense. Instead, the modern understanding of delusions militates toward considering
the defendant’s cognitive and emotional impairments when assessing her response
to a perceived (delusional) threat. It also calls for a broader understanding of “wrong”
that extends beyond illegality and could excuse actions taken in conformance with
the general thrust of a perceived legal justification or excuse, so long as the trier of
fact feels that the defendant’s objectives cohered with societal standards of morality.
Effectuating these changes would necessitate a transformation in defense-side
perceptions of moral incapacity, modifications in jury instructions, and an
invigoration of the practice of defense attorneys and forensic experts.384 Legal
experts have suggested that defense attorneys and forensic experts may unblinkingly
accept narrow conceptions of the key functionality (“know” or even “appreciate”) in
insanity tests,385 and that forensic experts tend to offer conclusory opinions on sanity
without much reasoning in support.386 These practices must change. Despite
misconceptions about the narrow category of impairments relevant to insanity,387
courts overwhelmingly admit all mental state evidence, whether cognitive,
emotional, or volitional.388 Moreover, although often not providing jury instructions
on key terms such as “know,”389 when they do, courts tend to define these terms
broadly.390 Defense counsel should work to educate themselves on reasoning
impairments associated with psychosis,391 educate their forensic experts on the scope
of impairments relevant to legal insanity,392 help develop testimony on these sources
of dysfunction,393 and request jury instructions on their relevance to the legal test.394
In addition, forensic experts should expand the scope of their examinations,395 the
detail provided in their sanity evaluation reports,396 and the testimony given at trial.
Forensic scholars have long complained of the low standards applied by evaluators

384. Abraham Goldstein advocated for many of these reforms in 1967. See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 94.
385. See supra notes 19–20, 25.
386. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 19–20, 25.
388. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 114.
390. See supra notes 104–113 and accompanying text.
391. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 125–26, 134–35.
392. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
393. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 94 (“Unless an extraordinary effort is made, lawyers
will probably continue to put only conclusionary questions to experts, usually cast in the words
of the insanity test itself. And experts will come to believe ‘the law’ is not interested in a
detailed description of the defendant’s mental state but only in the answers to the test
questions.”); supra note 17 (referring to model direct examination and expert testimony).
394. See Bonnie, supra note 328, at 62; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 105; FINGARETTE,
supra note 52, at 239–40.
395. See supra note 17 (referring to model direct examination and expert testimony).
396. Detailed reports are particularly important given the high percentage of cases
adjudicated outside of the trial process. See supra note 13.
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in sanity evaluations.397 Training materials and practice guides provide
methodologies for comprehensive assessment398 and generation of reports.399 Experts
should also provide the trier of fact with more of the reasoning supporting their
ultimate conclusions to allow jurors to perform their moral and legal function.400
Although the wording of insanity tests does not appear to matter to verdicts
rendered,401 juror decision-making studies have found that jurors pay great care to
expert testimony.402 Indeed, some evidence suggests that jurors would appreciate
more of it,403 particularly from defense forensic expert witnesses.404 And history

397. See supra note 15.
398. See Amanda L. Reed & Patricia A. Zapf, Criminal Forensic Assessment, in
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 79, 79–103 (Ronald Roesch & Alana N.
Cook eds., 2017); Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S21–S26; MELTON ET AL., supra note 5, §
8.06.
399. See Janofsky et al., supra note 15, at S26–S28.
400. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
401. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Ray Shaw, Susan Bercaw & Juliann Koch, Insanity
Defenses: From the Jurors’ Perspective, 9 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 77, 83–84 (1985) (finding, in
a study of 132 undergraduates, no overall significant differences among six instructions and
tests of insanity); Ronald L. Poulson et al., Mock Jurors’ Insanity Defense Verdict Selections:
The Role of Evidence, Attitudes, and Verdict Options, 12 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 743,
752 (1997); James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror
Decision Making, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 522–23 (1991) (finding, in experiments
involving 177 and 226 undergraduates, no significant effects on mock jurors’ verdicts for
insanity instructions (including no instructions), the assignment of burden of proof, or standard
of proof).
402. See Rita M. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. SOC. 563, 566 & tbl.
3 (1959) (finding, in a study of 240 actual jurors in a mock insanity case dominated by
psychiatric expert testimony, that jurors in each educational category exhibited a very high
percentage—71 to 78 percent—of accurate and pertinent comments concerning the recall of
testimony); Rita M. James, Jurors’ Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 SOC. PROBS. 58,
65 (1959) (analyzing the deliberations of ten juries in an insanity case and observing that jurors
“paid careful attention to the testimony of the two [defense] experts,” and, in each deliberation,
discussed and expressed strong opinions about it). James is the maiden name of Rita Simon, a
preeminent scholar of remarkable breadth.
403. See Rita M. James, Jurors’ Evaluation of Psychiatric Testimony, 21 OHIO STATE L.J.
75, 84–85 (1960) (finding, in a sample of 816 jurors, that 44% of jurors who found the
defendant NGRI, but only 29% of jurors who found the defendant guilty, wished they had
been provided more information from defense psychiatric expert witnesses).
404. Id. at 84, 87–88 (finding the overwhelming majority (74%) of sample jurors found the
two defense psychiatric witnesses helpful and rating the two defense psychiatrists more
important than the six other witnesses in the insanity trial, with the exception of the
complaining witnesses); Ogloff, supra note 401, at 525–26 (finding that student mock jurors
identified expert psychiatric testimony to be most important when determining whether to find
a defendant NGRI); Karen E. Whittemore & James R.P. Ogloff, Factors that Influence Jury
Decision Making: Dispositional Instructions and Mental State at the Time of the Trial, 19 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 283, 295–96 & tbl.5 (1995) (finding, in a study of 349 student mock jurors,
that the two most important factors listed by participants as important in deciding the
defendant’s verdict were mental state prior to the offense (n=87) and expert testimony (n=72)).
However, other research indicates that accurate identification of the factors leading to
decisions may be elusive. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More
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proves that testimony of expert witnesses evincing a broader understanding of
significant impairment and irresponsibility can change public conceptions of
insanity, even without a change in the wording of the insanity test.405 Given the large
gap between medical and some courtroom actors’ legal understanding of the key
functionality in moral incapacity (knowing or possibly appreciating
wrongfulness)406—and evidence of narrow conceptions of insanity amongst the
public407—testimony on disordered reasoning, including reasoning impairments
associated with delusions, is essential for the law to keep pace with evolving medical
knowledge and to keep the responsibility inquiry tethered to moral blameworthiness.

Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCH. REV. 231 (1977).
405. See Joel Peter Eigen, Delusion in the Courtroom: The Role of Partial Insanity in Early
Forensic Testimony, 35 MED. HIST. 25, 38–48 (1991) (tracing how expert medical witnesses
in London insanity trials between the years 1825 and 1843 used court testimony to redefine
the meaning of “know,” change the content of the legal test of insanity from global to partial,
and shift jurors from “an exclusively intellectualist conception of the mind to a consideration
of the potency of will and emotion in human, and particularly criminal behavior”); JOEL PETER
EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MANESS AND MAD-DOCTORS IN THE ENGLISH COURT (1995)
(showing how the understanding of madness changed over time, including the treatment of
delusions and the increasing role of impairment of will, through a systematic investigation of
medical testimony in British insanity trials from 1760 to 1843).
406. See supra notes 22, 25.
407. See Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors’ Personal
Conceptions of Insanity and Their Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L.
561, 581, 589–90, 601 (2001) (finding, in a series of studies with former venirepersons and
students, that jurors harbor complex, multifaceted prototypes of insanity and identifying three
broad prototypes for insanity that share the common characteristics of symptoms of psychosis,
multiple impairments at the time of the crime, and mental states supported by expert evidence).
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is not 903
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for (N.H.
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conduct
if, as aState
resultv.ofAbbott, 503
his actions.”[a]n
State
v. Fichera,
A.2dresponsible
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A.2d 791, 794 (N.H.
1985)).
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to recognize
reality;
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. § 12.47.010(a)
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ALASKA STAT
b. It is
an essential
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individual
evidence
to rebut
the state ofelement
mind element
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offense,charged
see id. §12.47.020.
Idaho,act
willfully.
Kansas,
Montana, and Utah do not afford an affirmative insanity defense but allow mental
health evidence to rebut the mens rea of a charged offense. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1), (3)

. CODE
12.1-04.1-01(1)
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limits
affirmative
defense to
N.D. CENT
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ONT. CODE
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§ 46-14-102
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evidence to
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do not (2015).
afford an affirmative insanity defense but allow mental
411. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (2010). Arizona has a “guilty except insane”
health evidence
to rebut the mens rea of a charged offense. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1), (3)
verdict where the defendant, if successful in her affirmative defense of insanity, shall be
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§ incarceration
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the alleged
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to “[c]onform
or her insane”
verdict where the defendant, if successful in her affirmative defense of insanity, shall be
sentenced “to a term of incarceration in the state department of corrections and . . . placed
under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board and committed to a state mental
health facility under the department of health services . . . for that term.” Id. § 13-502(D).
412. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-312, 5-2-301(6) (Supp. 2019). This insanity standard also
includes a volitional prong, providing for acquittal when, due to a mental disease or defect, a
defendant lacked the capacity at the time of the alleged offense to “[c]onform his or her
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that provides: “A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act,
omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury,
or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act
which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.” Id. § 16-3-3.
419. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400(1) (2014). This insanity standard also includes a
volitional prong, providing for acquittal when, due to a physical or mental disease, disorder,
or defect, a defendant lacked the substantial capacity at the time of the alleged offense to
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retardation, a defendant lacked the substantial capacity at the time of the alleged offense to
“conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” Id.
427. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 62 N.E.3d 22, 28 (Mass. 2016). This insanity standard
also includes a volitional prong, providing for acquittal when, after the defendant has admitted
some evidence of irresponsibility, the Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime that
caused the defendant to lack the substantial capacity to “conform his conduct to the
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Laboring Laboring
under suchunder such
430
defect
of defect of
Mississippi430Mississippi
Not to Not to
reason from
reason from
disease of
disease of the mind
the mind
Missouri431
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is, that the act
is not
by

What he was
doing was authorized
law
wrong

Know

What he was
doing was
wrong

MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2019).
Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (Miss. 2008).
MO. REV. STAT. § 562.086(1) (2016).
State v. Hotz, 795 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Neb. 2011).
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84–85 (Nev. 2001).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4–1 (West 2015).
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Cognitive Incapacity
Moral Incapacity
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New Mexico435Jurisdiction
Did not Actual
Know
Did not
quality of the Actual
Level of
Level of Know
the mind disease
wrong
Incapacity
Nature/quality
Incapacity
Wrongfulness
act
lack
understanding
lack
understanding
Mental Disease of
Lacked
Nature
Lacked
Nature
andand
Theoract was Such conduct
To know
To know
435
Did notsubstantial
Knowor
quality
of the
Did not
New York436New Mexico
disease or the mind
consequences
substantial Know
wrong
appreciate
appreciate
was wrong
act
defect
capacity
of such conduct
capacity
Mental
Lacked
Nature and
Lacked
To know or
To know or
Such conduct
Laboring
436
New York
disease or
substantial
consequences
substantial
appreciate
appreciate
was wrong Between right
under such a defect
capacity
of such
conduct
capacity
Nature
and
North
and wrong in
defect of Laboring
Incapable
Knowing
Incapable
Distinguishing
quality of the
Between right relation to
under such a
Carolina437
reason, from
Natureact
and
North
and wrong in
such act
disease of defect of
Incapable
Knowing
quality of the
Incapable
Distinguishing
Carolina437
relation to
reason, from
act
the mind disease of
such act
Severe the mind
Wrongfulness
Severe
mental
Wrongfulnessof the person’s
Ohio438
Did not
Know
mental
438
or
Ohiodisease
Did not
Know
of the person’s
acts
defect disease or
acts
defect
Nature Nature
Does
Does
Acts are
prong: prong:
not not
KnowActs are
Know
wrong
disability of
wrong
disability of
reason or reason or
Nature
or
Nature or
disease of disease of
consequences
Oklahoma439
Does not
Understand
the mind
consequences
of his acts or
Right from
Oklahoma439
Does not
Understand
the mind
of
his acts or
omissions
wrong with Right from
WrongfulUnable
To distinguish
omissions
respect to his wrong with
Wrongful-ness prong:
Unable
To distinguish
acts
respect to his
mental
ness prong:
acts
disability
mental
disability Qualifying
Lacks
Criminality of
Jurisdiction

Mental
disease

Actual
2022]
lack

Oregon440

Oregon

440

Pennsylvania

mental

substantial
To appreciate
capacity Lacks

Qualifying disorder
mental Laboring
disorder under such a

defect of
441
Pennsylvania
Laboringreason, from
under such adisease of
defect of the mind
441

reason, from
disease of
the mind

Not

Not

To know

To know

Nature and
quality of the
act

Nature and
quality of the
act

To appreciate

substantial
capacity

Not

the conduct

Know

Not

Criminality of
the conduct

He was doing
what was
wrong

Know

He was doing
what was
wrong

435. State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1977). “This rule prevailed in New Mexico
until 1954 when this court in State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (1954) made a careful analysis of
the authorities and made a limited extension of the M’Naghten rule, adding a third ingredient.
The court held that if the accused, [] as a result of disease of the mind ‘was incapable of
himself from
committing’
the (N.M.
crime, he
could “This
be adjudged
insane andinthereby
435. preventing
State v. Hartley,
565 P.2d
658, 660
1977).
rule prevailed
New Mexico
relieved
legalcourt
responsibility
would270
otherwise
be a criminal
until 1954
whenof this
in Stateforv.what
White,
P.2d 727
(1954) act.”
madeId.a careful analysis of
436. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2009).
the authorities
and made a limited extension of the M’Naghten rule, adding a third ingredient.
437. State v. Thompson, 402 S.E.2d 386, 390 (N.C. 1991).
The court438.
heldOthat
if the accused, [] as a result of disease of the mind ‘was incapable of
HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (LexisNexis 2014).
preventing439.
himself
from
committing’
crime,Crim.
he App.
could1995).
be adjudged insane and thereby
Cheney
v. State,
909 P.2d 74,the
90 (Okla.
ORresponsibility
. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1)
insanity standard
also includes
volitional
relieved of440.
legal
for what(2019).
wouldThis
otherwise
be a criminal
act.” aId.
for §acquittal
when, due to2009).
a mental disorder, a defendant lacked the
436. prong,
N.Y. Pproviding
ENAL LAW
40.15 (McKinney
capacity at the time of the alleged offense to “conform the conduct to the
437. substantial
State v. Thompson,
402 S.E.2d 386, 390 (N.C. 1991).
requirements of law.” Id.
438. O441.
HIO R18
EVP.AC
ODE
A
NN
2901.01(A)(14)
(LexisNexis
. CONS. STAT.. §§ 314(d)
(2015); M’Naghten’s
Case, 82014).
Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Cl.
909 P.2d 74, 90 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
439. &Cheney
State,
Fin. 200,v.210
(1843).

440. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1) (2019). This insanity standard also includes a volitional
prong, providing for acquittal when, due to a mental disorder, a defendant lacked the
substantial capacity at the time of the alleged offense to “conform the conduct to the
requirements of law.” Id.
441. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314(d) (2015); M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, 10 Cl.
& Fin. 200, 210 (1843).
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Level of
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Incapacity

Nature/quality
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South
Carolina443

Moral Incapacity
Level of
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Wrongfulness
understanding
[Vol.
97:297
Capacity
was so
substantMoral Incapacity
Level of
Incapacityially
Wrongfulness
understanding
Wrongfulness
impaired
To appreciate
Capacity
of his conduct
that he
was so
substant-cannot
ially justly be
Wrongfulness
impaired held
To appreciate
of his conduct
that he
responsible
cannot
Moral or legal
justly be
right from
heldLacked the
Distinguish
capacity
moral or legal
responsible
Moral or legal
wrong
right from The particular
Lacked the
Distinguish
moral or legal
capacity
Lacked the
wrong act charged as
Recognize
capacity
The particular morally or
Lacked the
act charged aslegally wrong

Actual
lack

Actual
lack
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defect

Rhode Island442

South
Carolina443
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defect

capacity

The
condition of
The
a person condition of
South Dakota444
temporarily a person
444
or partially
South Dakota
temporarily
deprived ofor partially
reason deprived of

Recognize

Incapable
Incapable

morally or
legally wrong

Knowing

Knowing

Wrongfulness
of act

Wrongfulness
of act

reason

Tennessee

445

Severe Severe
mental mental
Tennessee445
disease or disease or
defect
defect

Unable
Unable

appreciate
ToTo
appreciate

WrongfulnessWrongfulness
of the
of the
UnableUnable
To appreciate
To appreciate
defendant’s defendant’s
acts
acts

Natureof of
Nature
thethe
defendant’s
defendant’s
acts
acts

Severe

Texas446

Severe mental
mental disease or
disease or defect
defect

Texas446

Vermont447

Vermont447

Mental
disease or
defect

Mental
disease or
defect

Did not

His conduct
was wrong

Know

Did not

Know

Lacks
adequate
To appreciate
capacity Lacks

adequate
capacity

His conduct
was wrong

Criminality of
his or her
conduct Criminality

To appreciate

his or her
conduct

442. State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 12 n.10 (R.I. 2012). In addition, “[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
defect, his capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law [was] so
impaired43
thatA.3d
he cannot
justly
be held
responsible.”
Id. addition, “[a] person is not
442. substantially
State v. Carpio,
1, 12
n.10
(R.I.
2012). In
443. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(A) (2014).
responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
444. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(20) (2017).
defect, his445.
capacity
. . AtoNNconform
his conduct
TENN. C. ODE
. § 39-11-501(a)
(2018). to the requirements of the law [was] so
substantially
that
he cannot
justly (West
be held
responsible.” Id.
446.impaired
TEX. PENAL
CODE
ANN. § 8.01(a)
2011).
447.CODE
VT. SA
TAT
.A
. tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1)
443. S.C.
NN
. §NN17-24-10(A)
(2014).(2019). This insanity standard also includes a
prong, providing
acquittal when,
due to a mental disease or defect, a defendant
LAWS §for
22-1-2(20)
(2017).
444. volitional
S.D. CODIFIED
lacked adequate capacity at the time of the alleged offense to “conform his or her conduct to
445. the
TENN
.
C
ODE ANN. § 39-11-501(a) (2018).
requirements of law.” Id.

446. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West 2011).
447. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1) (2019). This insanity standard also includes a
volitional prong, providing for acquittal when, due to a mental disease or defect, a defendant
lacked adequate capacity at the time of the alleged offense to “conform his or her conduct to
the requirements of law.” Id.
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Virginia448
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doing was
defect
act
wrong
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Level of
Actual
Level of
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Incapacity
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understanding
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What he was Right from
defect,
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448
Virginia
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Did not
Know
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Know
doing was wrong with
Nature
and Did not
mind
of
the
defect
act of the
Washington449
Unable
To perceive
Unable
To tell wrong
quality
reference to
actor was Mental
act
the particular
affected to disease or
Right from act charged
such an defect, the
Nature and
wrong with
of the
449
extent
thatmind
Washington
Unable
To perceive
quality of the
Unable
To tell
reference to
actor was
act
the particular
Mental affected to
West
Lack the
act charged Wrongfulness
To appreciate
disease or such an
450
Virginia
capacity
of his act
defect extent that
Mental
Lack theLacked
WrongfulnessWrongfulness
WestMental
disease or
To appreciate
450
capacity
of his act of his or her
Wisconsin451 Virginia
To appreciate
disease
or defect
substantial
defect Mental
Lackedcapacity
Wrongfulness conduct
451
Wisconsin
disease or
substantial
To appreciate
of his or her Wrongfulness
Mental
Lacked
capacity
conduct
Wyoming452
To appreciate
illness or defect
substantial
of his or her
Mental
Lackedcapacity
Wrongfulness conduct
deficiency
452
Wyoming
illness or
substantial
To appreciate
of his or her
Severe deficiency
capacity
conduct
Nature and
Wrongfulness
mental Severe
453
Federal
Unable
To appreciate
Unable
To appreciate
quality
of his
Nature and
of his acts
disease
or
Wrongfulness
mental
Federal453
Unable
To appreciate
qualityacts
of his
Unable
To appreciate
of his acts
defect disease or
acts
defect
Mental
Lacked
Mental
Lacked
District of District of
Wrongfulness
Wrongfulness
To recognize
disease or disease or
substantial
substantial
To recognize
Columbia454 Columbia454
of his conductof his conduct
defect
capacity
defect
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448. Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.5 (Va. 2010). “In addition, we
have approved in appropriate cases the granting of an instruction defining an ‘irresistible
as v.
a form
of legal insanity.691
‘TheS.E.2d
irresistible
impulse
doctrine
applicable
to
448. impulse’
Orndorff
Commonwealth,
177,
179 n.5
(Va.is2010).
“Inonly
addition,
we
that class in
of cases
where thecases
accusedthe
is able
to understand
nature and consequences
his
have approved
appropriate
granting
of anthe
instruction
defining anof‘irresistible
knows it is wrong, but his mind has become so impaired by disease that he is totally
impulse’actasand
a form
of legal insanity. ‘The irresistible impulse doctrine is applicable only to
deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his act.’” Id. (quoting Thompson v.
that class
of cases where
the accused
able1952)).
to understand the nature and consequences of his
Commonwealth,
70 S.E.2d
284, 292is(Va.
act and knows
it ASH
is wrong,
but§his
mind has
become so impaired by disease that he is totally
449. W
. REV. CODE
9A.12.010
(2015).
v. Fleming,
784toS.E.2d
743, or
751–52
(W. Va.
insanity
acquittal
can
deprived 450.
of theState
mental
power
control
restrain
his2016).
act.’”AnId.
(quoting
Thompson
v.
also be based
a lack of
capacity
to conform
his acts to the requirements of law. Id.
Commonwealth,
70onS.E.2d
284,
292 (Va.
1952)).
451. WIS. STAT. § 971.15(1) (2016). An insanity acquittal can also be based on a lack of
EV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2015).
449. substantial
WASH. Rcapacity
to “conform his . . . conduct to the requirements of law.” Id.
450. State
743,(2019).
751–52
Va.acquittal
2016).can
Analso
insanity
can
452. v.
WFleming,
YO. STAT. A784
NN. §S.E.2d
7-11-304(a)
An (W.
insanity
be basedacquittal
on a
also be based
a lack capacity
of capacity
to conform
his acts
torequirements
the requirements
lack of on
substantial
to “conform
his conduct
to the
of law.”of
Id.law. Id.
U.S.C.
§ 17.
451. W453.
IS. S18
TAT
. § 971.15(1)
(2016). An insanity acquittal can also be based on a lack of
Betheatov.“conform
United States,
64, 79to&the
n.30requirements
(D.C. 1976). An
acquittal
substantial454.
capacity
his365
. . .A.2d
conduct
of insanity
law.” Id.
can also be based on a lack of a substantial capacity “to conform his conduct to the
NN. § 7-11-304(a) (2019). An insanity acquittal can also be based on a
452. requirements
WYO. STATof. A
law.” Id.

lack of substantial capacity to “conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Id.
453. 18 U.S.C. § 17.
454. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 79 & n.30 (D.C. 1976). An insanity acquittal
can also be based on a lack of a substantial capacity “to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.” Id.
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